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Abstract 
 
On December 2
nd
, 2015, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials extended an 
invitation to Montenegro in order to initiate official talks with the government regarding its 
membership to the Alliance as its 29
th
 member. While numerous proponents and opponents of the 
newest wave of eastern enlargement had analyzed the motivation behind NATO’s foreign 
policies from different perspectives, a common ground was still present in their assessment: 
NATO’s concerns about Montenegro lie mainly on the provisions of Article 10, since 
Montenegro does not possess the necessary material capabilities to provide a substantial 
contribution to the Alliance. In other words, NATO was using Montenegro as a political pawn to 
demonstrate to Russia the robustness of the Open Door Policy and the solidarity of the Alliance. 
Although Montenegro’s accession to NATO can be considered, to some extent, as a response to 
Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine war and its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, I propose 
that Montenegro’s geopolitical importance was significant for NATO, and that NATO was 
acceding Montenegro as the  result of a balancing act against a perceived Russian threat. In this 
thesis, in order to analyze this phenomenon, the Congruence Method of analysis was utilized on a 
single revelatory case; Montenegro. The Congruence Method allowed the utilization of two 
existing theories; the Balance of Threat Theory and the Classical Geopolitics, in a 
complementary manner. The results showed that in addition to the threat against the Euro-
Atlantic integrity caused by the Ukraine war, Russia was also creating another perceived threat 
with its repetitive requests to establish a naval base in Montenegro. The thesis reveals that due to 
the uncertainties of the Syrian war, Russia was in search of an additional naval base in the 
Mediterranean Sea which led its strategic interests to the coasts of Montenegro, the only country 
in the Adriatic region which is not a NATO member. Consequently, the research concluded that 
NATO was balancing against a potential threat from Russia which stemmed from the geopolitical 
importance of Montenegro. 
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1. Introduction 
 
On December 2
nd
, 2015, the Foreign Ministers of the NATO Alliance invited Montenegro to 
initiate accession talks to adhere the nation as its 29
th
 member (NATO News, 2015). 
Consequently, NATO had begun its fourth wave of eastward enlargement since the end of the 
Cold War. In other words, while NATO had been mainly focusing on the Western European 
countries during the Cold War era - excluding Turkey and Greece which joined the Alliance in 
1952 - in the period starting from 1999, these policies became more Central and Eastern Europe 
oriented. In 1996, former US President Clinton announced that to celebrate the 50
th
 anniversary 
of the Alliance, NATO would run an enlargement campaign towards the former Soviet Bloc to 
eliminate the emergence of any possible "gray zone of insecurity" in Europe (Mitchell, 1996). 
Hence, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact; NATO enlargement proceeded initially with the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999; Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004; Albania and Croatia in 2009; and lastly Montenegro in 2017.    
From the very first wave of the eastward enlargement, NATO faced adverse reactions from 
Russia (Shifrinson, 2017: 109). It was apparent that Russia perceived NATO’s actions as a threat. 
The Russian government declared that “the Russian strategy [...] is to undermine NATO 
effectiveness” and that “[w]e want to have NATO as weak as possible because we are not part of 
it” (Gordon, 1999). This derogatory rhetoric may suggest that Russia felt betrayed by NATO’s 
insistence on approaching the former Yugoslav countries due to an alleged "promise" that NATO 
had made during the German unification talks in the 1990s. This "promise" was a mutual 
understanding between NATO and Russia in the sense that if Russia allowed and supported the 
unification of Germany then NATO, more specifically the United States, would never move 
beyond Germany or approach the communist States for membership (Kramer, 2009: 39). 
However, the chronology of the expansion of NATO clearly demonstrates that this is precisely 
what NATO did, starting from the former Warsaw countries and then moving beyond, towards 
the former Yugoslav States which added to the historical tensions between NATO and Russia 
(Wolff, 2015: 1105). Thus, despite the fear of provoking Russian aggression (Ibid: 1109) and 
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consequently leaving the overall security of Europe in a potentially precarious position, NATO is 
still displaying its persistence by moving forward under its prominent Open Door Policy. 
NATO based this particular strategy on  Article 10
1
 of the Washington Treaty (NATO Official 
Website, 2017) which states that “NATO’s door remains open to any European country in a 
position to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security 
in the Euro-Atlantic area” (Ibid). In other words, the provisions of Article 10 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty (North Atlantic Treaty, 1949) enable the Member States to invite any state within 
the European continent to become a member without the involvement or the interference of any 
third party. From a critical perspective, the introduction of this policy and its legal framework 
that was adopted unanimously by the Member States can be considered as a clear demonstration 
of NATO's interest in expanding its territory within Europe, regardless of the reactions from "the 
third parties."   
The third-party interference here refers mainly to Russia and its criticism over the NATO 
enlargement, particularly the accession of Montenegro. Russia most certainly tried to interfere, 
obstruct and stall NATO's invitation to Montenegro in 2015, through mobilizing pro-Russian 
protestors from the Democratic Front, a pro-Western government opposition party (Recknagel, 
2015). Although Moscow denied its involvement in the uprising of the demonstrators, the Serbian 
Orthodox Church made a statement during a protest on how they “grieve over Montenegro's 
separation from Mother Russia" (Boskovic, 2015). Russia, on the other hand, continued its 
negative rhetoric towards the Montenegrin government’s willingness to join and threatened 
Montenegro to cease the joint projects with the state if the membership process were to become 
consolidated (Emmott & Siebold, 215). This would be a potentially hard blow to Montenegrin 
economy considering that Russia was operating the majority of Montenegro's foreign-owned 
companies and real estate businesses (Tomovic, 2016).  Furthermore, according to the Russian 
International Affairs Council’s (RIAC) announcement, between 2001 and 2010, Russia had 
invested over 500 million dollars in Montenegro and that by 2012, 32% of the enterprises in 
                                                          
1
 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, 34 UNTS 243, Article 10: “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other 
European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its 
instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States 
of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession”. 
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Montenegro owned by Russia (Pivovarenko, 2014). However, Russia did not limit its opposition 
campaign against NATO's invitation to Montenegro only to supporting protesters and recurring to 
economic threats. Right after the announcement of the invitation, the Russian presidential 
spokesman Dmitry Peskov, warned NATO that "Moscow has always said at various levels that 
the continuing expansion of NATO, the NATO military infrastructure eastward, of course, cannot 
help but lead to a response from the east, that is, from Russia, in terms of ensuring security and 
maintaining a parity of interests" (Russia Beyond, 2015). However, he did not specify what kind 
of response NATO should expect from Moscow.   
It is a well-known fact that Russia had always perceived NATO’s enlargement as a threat and 
NATO's continuation to do so had added fuel to the existing NATO-Russian tensions. The 
NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, tried to ease Russia's concerns by stating that 
Montenegro's accession to NATO was not a threat to Russia but an attempt to integrate the 
Western Balkans further into Europe (Buckley et al., 2015). The US Secretary of State, John 
Kerry, emphasized the importance of NATO's Open Door Policy by stating that Montenegro's 
accession is a step towards a Europe “that is whole, free and at peace” (Ibid). However, this 
campaign was still qualified as an "irresponsible policy" by Russia, and NATO's approach to 
Montenegro was defined as “a mistake, even a provocation” by the Russian Foreign Minister, 
Sergei Lavrov (Teffer, 2015). The fact that Russia saw NATO’s enlargement as a "reckless 
expansion of its geopolitical space, artificial division of states into ‘us’ and ‘them” (Buckley et 
al., 2015) speaks volumes about how isolated the country was feeling from Europe. However, as 
the Former NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said "[w]e also need to be 
realistic in recognizing that NATO will continue its Open Door policy -- not because of any 
intention to ‘encircle' or marginalize Russia, but because respect for territorial integrity and the 
right of each sovereign state to freely decide security policy and alignments are fundamental if 
Europe is to be truly ‘whole and free'" (NATO Speeches, 2009). From these statements, it is 
evident that this small Western Balkan country's pro-western trajectory had enlarged the rift 
between NATO and Russia, and once again brought a clear picture as to how they perceive one 
another.   
In the view of these altercations between NATO and Russia, a rhetorical question comes to mind; 
is Montenegro solely a political pawn being manipulated between these two rivals, or is this 
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nation bringing something to the table for NATO? From the Montenegrin perspective, the 
country never wavered from its path towards NATO membership and demonstrated a level of 
commitment towards this since obtaining its sovereignty. It joined the Partnership of Peace (PfP) 
Program in 2006, and joined the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 2009, all of which were the 
expected steps to be taken to obtain NATO membership (NATO Archive, 2017). Montenegro’s 
progress; however, still does not explain to what extent the smallest former Yugoslav country 
(Darmanovic, 2007: 152) can provide a contribution to the Alliance with an average population 
of 600.000 and approximately 2.000 soldiers (Farkas, 2015). Robert E. Hunter, the former US 
Ambassador to NATO, explains NATO membership invitation to Montenegro as a "test case" of 
NATO’s Open Door Policy as a response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's annexation of 
Crimea to its borders (Hunter, 2015). In fact, Mr. Hunter was resonating the views of several 
critiques at the time of this invitation, which coincided and with the war in Ukraine (Kaminski, 
2015; Roberts, 2015; Lomonosov, 2016). Moreover, considering that "the Ukrainian crisis has 
created the deepest rift between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War" (Wolff, 
2015: 1103), NATO's enlargement endeavors and its candidates were perceived as a geopolitical 
scheme of NATO to influence the Eastern European countries to create a line for containing 
Russia (French, 2014). However, pointing to Ukraine as the only reason for adhering Montenegro 
into NATO does not seem to do justice to Montenegro's potential contributions and years of 
arduous work to join the Alliance. More importantly, it does not take into account the geopolitical 
factors of Montenegro, particularly its location on the Adriatic Sea, which gives the state strategic 
importance within the context of geopolitics. 
The concept of geopolitics here is considered mainly as a tool for foreign policy-making which 
combines the geographical position of a state, the strategies, and the strengths that come from it 
(Wolff, 2015: 1104). Furthermore, although NATO has been promoting the implementation of its 
Open Door Policy via Article 10 to adhere Eastern European states to its Alliance, the invitation 
to accede Montenegro hints both to its geopolitical attributes and NATO's balancing role 
behavior against Russia. Thus, to further analyze the phenomenon here described, the author of 
this thesis conducts an in-depth analysis on Montenegro and sets out to answer the following 
research question: What is Montenegro’s geopolitical importance in the NATO-Russia dispute, 
and how does it affect NATO’s balancing behavior? 
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This research question will allow the researcher to find out what is the role of Montenegro's 
geopolitical importance in the NATO-Russian dispute, and whether this importance has any 
effect on NATO's balancing behavior. In this light, the significance of the research is twofold; 
both on an academic level and a societal one. 
On an academic level, the study will be conducted within the context of Montenegro's trajectory 
towards NATO; more specifically, the period when NATO extended an invitation to Montenegro 
in 2015 to initiate the official talks for a fully-fledged membership. While the NATO 
enlargement issue has been theoretically and empirically analyzed quite extensively through the 
years using approaches such as neoliberal institutionalism, constructivism, and neorealism, the 
newest member has yet to be addressed to any degree in the relevant literature. In fact, there is a 
striking absence in the relevant literature on Montenegro, and the limited number of studies on 
this case is almost exclusively framed within the emergence of the Russian threat derived from 
the Ukraine war. This research; however, is purposed to provide a satisfactory addition to this 
void in the literature and to present a unique theoretical approach to understanding the 
phenomenon.   
Instead of to applying the common practice of testing a number of relevant theories to determine 
which one explains the phenomenon the best, this study will utilize a complementary approach to 
signify that theories do not have to be rivals, and that they can be used to support one another to 
provide a complete analytical framework and to bring forth a more comprehensive understanding 
of the phenomenon in hand. In order to prove this point, the Balance of Threat Theory and 
Classical Geopolitics will be utilized. Both of these theories have somewhat been a victim of 
oversight when it comes to explaining NATO's balancing behavior in the face of a perceived 
threat, and more importantly, these theories have never been used in a complementary manner 
before. Hence, the complementary approach of the Balance of Threat Theory and Classical 
Geopolitics, combined with in-depth analysis on Montenegro, the reader will obtain a more 
comprehensive insight into the geopolitical importance of the sea, Montenegro's role in the 
NATO-Russian dispute and NATO's balancing behavior against a perceived threat. The readers 
will obtain further insight into the extent of the Open Door Policy of NATO applied to 
Montenegro and whether it has any links to the geopolitical importance of the country. 
Furthermore, due to the limited literature and resources concerning Montenegro's path to NATO 
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accession, the research will utilize an extensive media coverage which, although not the primary 
objective of the thesis, will also present the overall views and perceptions of analysts, critiques 
and Montenegrin people regarding the issue of Montenegro's NATO accession. 
In conclusion, considering that the analysis of this thesis will bring together relatively neglected 
theories, an interesting methodology, and a recent case selection to answer the research question 
as presented above, the approach of this study can motivate and encourage further analysis on 
similar cases. The importance of geopolitics, as one of the leading elements in this study, has a 
considerable influence in today's international world order which can be in the interest of 
decision-makers, policy-makers, and academics to produce new policies under broader 
considerations. 
 
1.1. The Structure of the Thesis 
 
This research consists of nine chapters. Chapter 2 provides an extensive review on NATO's need 
for enlargement, how it adds to the tensions between NATO and Russia, and Montenegro's role 
in these tensions on its way to NATO membership. Chapter 3 presents the origins, predictions, 
and mechanisms of the Balance of Threat Theory and Classical Geopolitics. Variables, case 
selection, data collection and detailed explanation of methodology are defined in Chapter 4. The 
analysis, which begins with Chapter 5, has two sub-sections. The first section only presents and 
illustrates descriptive data of the geopolitical factors, and the second section analysis all the 
relevant data on the geopolitical importance of Montenegro, and its importance for NATO. 
Chapter 6 introduces empirical evidence on NATO’s perceived threat using discourses from State 
officials and analyses how Montenegro’s geopolitical importance impacts NATO’s balancing 
behavior against a threat. Chapter 7, as the final chapter of analysis, explains to what extent 
Montenegro fulfills the prerequisites of the Open Door Policy. Lastly, chapters 8 and 9 provide 
an overall discussion on the results of the analysis, define the limitations of research and offer 
recommendations for further research.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
The literature review in this chapter is purposed to provide a more detailed outline of the critical 
points as introduced in the previous section. Thus, to provide a more organized structure, this 
section initially states the existing, ongoing debates and arguments concerning NATO's eastward 
enlargement, the tensions between NATO and Russia, and the views on Montenegro's alignment 
with NATO. Briefly, this chapter explains that while proponents of enlargement suggest that 
NATO needs to expand to survive and bring stability to Europe, opponents are more critical 
about whether frustrating Russia is worth the costs of enlargement.   
 
2.1. NATO’s Eastward Enlargement 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the enlargement process of  NATO had changed drastically 
with the Central and Eastern European revolutions in the final years of  the 1980s, when the post-
Soviet countries started to declare their independence and obtain statehood and to "return to 
Europe" in the sense of  joining NATO and the EU (Simon, 2001: 121). NATO was obviously 
aware that with its recently introduced Partnership for Peace Program in 1994, the overall 
rhetoric of cooperation with the former adversaries and the ongoing German reunification talks, 
further enlargement would be necessary for the future. Former US President Bill Clinton 
addressed the debates over the NATO enlargement policy in the NATO Summit of 1994 by 
stating that "the question is no longer whether NATO will take on a new member, but when and 
how" (Brown, 1994: 34). 
A significant number of academics and theorists brought a different explanation to understand 
and predict the survival of NATO and its enlargement policy. John Lewis Gaddis (1998) argued 
that NATO was initially, during the Cold War, acting under basic principles, such as balancing 
power, never underestimating the common enemies, and treating them accordingly. However, 
these principles were violated during Clinton's administration when NATO started "enlarging the 
enlargement process" (Gaddis, 1998: 150). Following Gaddis' argument, Dan Reiter (2001) also 
explained NATO's drastic decision on eastward enlargement as a means of deterrence for the 
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future aggression with Russia and the promotion of democracy, and the prevention of possible 
conflicts among the members (p. 41). Their viewpoints have great merit within the neorealist 
school of thought which asserts that if the Alliance can overcome their common threat, or if the 
threat itself is not as grandeur as it used to be, then there will be no need for states to commit to 
the Alliance (Kydd, 2001: 804). Adding to this school of thought, Mearsheimer (1994) 
introduced similar views within a Structural Realism perspective which, in his opinion, explains 
the State’s behavior better than many other theories. Since peace and constant cooperation 
without collaboration is impossible, States are prone to seek opportunities and take advantage of 
them when they find one to improve their relative position and power (Mearsheimer, 1994). 
Hence, sustainability of Alliances is not possible in a self-help world where everyone is 
competing with one another to maximize their power (Ibid: 11).  However, the NATO Alliance 
and its ongoing enlargement process indicate that the members of NATO still perceive Russia as 
a sufficient threat to motivate the Alliance to pursue its existence (Rauchhaus, 2000: 191), and 
even in a self-help world order, unity is strength against a common threat.   
Petar Kurečić (2008), on the other hand, argues that for the existence and sustainability of the 
NATO alliance, opposing the realist predictions on NATO’s survival, the post-Cold War 
presented a new era where the NATO had “transform[ed] itself in accordance with new 
challenges, and conditions” by enlarging towards the Balkan region (p. 27). However, it is 
observable that through such transformation, NATO also had to revise the conditions of 
eligibility for its potential candidates. While “qualifications of the aspirants for NATO 
membership” (Larrabee, 2010: 49) for Western states were much higher before 1999, such 
aspirations have become much lesser for the post-Soviet applicants, after 1999 (Ibid). The reason 
for such transformation is NATO's Open Door policy, which ultimately enabled the militarily and 
materially weaker states to become eligible for membership (Art, 2016: 341). Through the 
adoption of the Open Door Policy, NATO had clearly displayed a change of structure; from a 
greater military capability with its limited number of members to broader borders with 
questionable functionality (Ibid).  
From a Neoliberal Institutionalist perspective, such conditions offered an opportunity for the 
Member States who understood that they could gain more through cooperation and interaction, 
and consequently prolong the existence of the Alliance even after the raison d'être no longer 
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existed (Hellmann & Wolf, 1993: 3). The former US National Security Council, and a NATO 
official, Damon Wilson, stated, in an interview with the New Atlanticist that NATO's 
enlargement should also be considered as a demonstration of its self-confidence to the rest of the 
world (Kumar Sen, 2015). He explains that "it is quite important for the Alliance itself because 
you don’t enlarge if you don’t have a sense of confidence in your institution” (Ibid).  Although 
Mr. Wilson’s assertions were expressed within the lines of Montenegro’s accession to NATO, he 
still hints to the fact that Montenegro is an “important statement to Russia that we will not be 
intimidated by bullying” (Ibid).  
While this section explains NATO's need for enlargement in order to survive against the Russian 
threat, the commonly used theories do not incorporate the geopolitical considerations of NATO's 
enlargement behavior. Was NATO's enlargement towards Montenegro merely a response to 
"bullying"? Or, was Montenegro more important to NATO than merely functioning as a political 
pawn? This research will go beyond the existing review and analyze the geographic strength of 
Montenegro both for NATO and for Russia, to fully understand Montenegro's role in NATO's 
latest wave of enlargement. 
 
2.2. Tensions between NATO and Russia  
 
The mutual distrust between NATO and Russia is a well-known phenomenon among most of the 
relevant academia. As mentioned in the introduction, Russia believes that NATO had somewhat 
double-crossed it and not only persuaded Russia to support German reunification but also 
pursued the enlargement with the post-Soviet nations. The more skeptical academics view this 
enlargement as a cause for further aggression which can very easily lead to less cooperation and 
more disputes between the West and Russia (Kydd, 2001: 802). Andrej Krickovic (2016), in his 
research on the institutional binding, analyzes that Russia perceives NATO’s enlargement as a 
primary threat, not because for the fear that NATO would initiate military action against Russia, 
but because of the potential influence that NATO may have on Russia's political and economic 
mobility in Europe. Under this sense of isolation and marginalization from the Western countries, 
Russia had shown serious interest in joining NATO in 1992, 1996 and 2002, only to be turned 
down by Brussels, which demonstrated that Russia cannot and will not become a party to 
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NATO's geographical enlargement (Pouliot, 2010: 171). NATO allies, Germany and France in 
particular, were seriously opposed to Russia’s membership of NATO for a number of reasons. 
The first one is that including such a dominant power as Russia would destroy the transatlantic 
alliance (Ibid). The second reason was that NATO would be sharing borders with Asian 
countries, and thirdly the Russian dispute with these Asian countries, particularly with China, 
would reflect heavily on the Alliance (Duong, 2002).  
 
In addition to this sense of isolation, NATO’s persistence in enlarging towards Russian borders 
through Georgia and Ukraine sparked aggressive reactions from Kiev. The Russian Foreign 
Minister, Sergey Lavrov, defined this as "a colossal geopolitical shift" that would go against 
Russia's national interests (The New York Times, 2006). Andrew T. Wolff (2015) asserts that the 
value-driven enlargement policy of NATO has limitations since it does not account for how 
Russia perceives this enlargement from a geopolitical view (p. 1120). He further analyzes that 
geopolitical enlargement towards the Balkans would be too costly for NATO and that it should 
focus on more stable regions; such as the Scandinavian countries (Ibid). However, even though 
Wolff recognizes the importance of geopolitical enlargement which would allow NATO to 
"identify areas of critical strategic importance in Europe" (Ibid), he overlooks how NATO's 
geopolitical enlargement policy can change if a strategic area is under a potential external threat.   
As mentioned earlier, the annexation of Crimea, along with the Ukrainian crisis, triggered a sense 
of urgency in NATO. This was a demonstration of how vulnerable states in Europe could be if 
they were not committed to at least one of the two most prominent international organizations; 
the EU or NATO. The fact that Russia could pursue such aggressive actions directed at NATO 
and the EU was a wake-up call for the US, and this became a topic of priority during the NATO 
Summit in Wales in 2014 (NATO Press Release, 2014). The participants of the North Atlantic 
Council issued a declaration in Wales which explicitly acknowledged that NATO considered 
Russia’s aggressive behavior as a significant threat (Ibid). This threat, which caused a multi-
dimensional disturbance not only in Europe but also in the Middle East and North of Africa 
(Ibid), was referring to the Russian military actions both in Ukraine and in Syria. In light of this 
acknowledgement, since other aspirant countries; such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Macedonia, were not quite ready for full NATO membership, Bosnia because of its lack of 
progress in implementing necessary political reforms for its military properties and Macedonia 
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for its ongoing dispute with Greece over the country's name (Nič, 2015), NATO selected 
Montenegro as the most eligible and realistic nation to pursue. However, while the tensions are 
evident between NATO and Russia, the overall debate does not provide explicit information on 
how Montenegro’s trajectory towards NATO membership plays a role in these tensions.   
 
2.3. The Case of Montenegro  
 
Montenegro was invited to initiate the accession talks in December 2015 and received the formal 
invitation to join NATO in May 2016. This latest result of the Open Door policy was taken as an 
act of defiance in the face of Russian opposition, which was also declared by the Members of 
NATO Congress during the Warsaw Summit in 2016 (Belkin, 2016). As previously indicated in 
the introduction, the logic behind the invitation to Montenegro to join NATO has links to the 
annexation of Crimea to Russia which challenged "the fundamental principles of the European 
order" (European Council on Foreign Affairs, 2014). 
 
The consideration of NATO’s enlargement agenda through Montenegro created a division of 
scholarly opinions. Critical thinkers of NATO’s eastward enlargement, particularly in relation to 
Montenegro, question how a small country like Montenegro can bring a substantial contribution 
to the collective defense organization, especially after its potential membership has received  so 
much opposition from Russia (Herszebhorn, 2017; Gramer, 2015; Saideman, 2015; Farkas, 
2015). Furthermore, these skeptics also bring forth their concerns about the unanimity within the 
NATO Alliance itself. Member States like Germany and France displayed a level of reluctance 
towards NATO's enlargement and presented their concerns about Montenegro’s readiness to 
become a member. These concerns lie mainly within the lines of the domestic turmoil caused by 
the Montenegrins' perception on NATO, the rule of law, and the ongoing corruption within the 
state (Hunter, 2015; Nič, 2015). Proponents of Montenegro's accession to the NATO Alliance, on 
the other hand, are rather more optimistic about the country's preparedness for fully-fledged 
membership. Damon Wilson (Kumar Sen, 2015), as introduced earlier, stated that Montenegro 
implemented important reforms on its path towards the EU and NATO membership and 
displayed great initiative related to other problems in its governmental system (Kumar Sen, 
2015). The former NATO Secretary General, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, in an interview also stated 
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that although the Member States of the Alliance should respect the Russian drawn “red lines” that 
consist of Georgia and Ukraine, this cannot be said for Montenegro, since Montenegro is the least 
complicated case among the candidates (Tavberidze, 2018). Thus, proponents demonstrate more 
enthusiasm about NATO’s enlargement agenda bringing stability to the Western Balkan region 
which they consider as a demonstration of NATO’s unity against the ongoing instabilities within 
Europe (Roberts, 2015; Lomonosov, 2016). 
 
 In addition to these schools of thought, statements about the ultimate goal of NATO's latest wave 
of enlargement add a different view on Montenegro's readiness for membership. A senior NATO 
official, who wanted to remain anonymous, stated about the diplomats within NATO that "[t]hey 
want to show NATO isn't afraid of enlargement and will lock the Balkans into the Euro-Atlantic 
strategy and won't leave them in limbo" (Kaminski, 2015). Another geographical view on 
NATO's enlargement came from the senior member of the Democratization Policy Council, Bodo 
Weber, who analyzes Montenegro's accession as a strategic move of the US administration "to 
close off geopolitical space for Russian meddling, contain Putin's imagination he can return 
Russia to global power" (Abramowitz, 2017). However, he does not explain what "the meddling" 
is in this context. Thus, the research in this thesis also aims to identify whether there was an 
already existing Russian meddling or a potential one during the period in which NATO invited 
Montenegro in 2015.    
In conclusion, although all three sections in this chapter provide an overview of the hostility 
between NATO, Russia and Montenegro’s role in that political climate, there are still other 
important aspects to consider for NATO’s accession of Montenegro, such as the geopolitical one. 
Because of the recentness of the phenomenon, academic studies on Montenegro are quite scarce 
and limited. As an example, while Srđan Orlandić’s (2016) article stands out regarding the 
subject of NATO's enlargement and Montenegro's geopolitical importance. His study, like the 
others, links the phenomenon to the threat that Russia represents for Europe instigated by the 
Ukraine war. However, while Orlandić understands Montenegro’s geopolitical importance as a 
political pawn caused by the annexation of Crimea, this research further proposes to investigate 
whether Montenegro became a cause of tension between NATO and Russia because of its 
geopolitical importance.  
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1. Theories 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical understanding of the Balance of Threat 
Theory and the Classical Geopolitics. The importance of choosing the Balance of Threat Theory 
in this research is twofold: Firstly, this theory can explain the behavior of an Alliance in the face 
of a perceived threat better than the Balance of Power Theory, or the other sub-theories; such as 
Neoliberalism, and Neorealism. Secondly, the theory's mechanisms are more closely linked to the 
geographic features of a perceived threat. This is particularly important since the research 
purposes to utilize a complementary approach for theoretical synthesis with the Balance of Threat 
and the Classical Geopolitics. Geopolitics, on the other hand, provides a deeper understanding of 
how the geographic position of a state can affect the foreign policies of a country, or in this case, 
NATO's balancing behavior. 
 
3.1.1 The Balance of Threat Theory  
 
The Balance of Threat Theory was initially developed and introduced by Stephan M. Walt (1987) 
in his book Origins of Alliances, which was primarily influenced by Waltz's (1979) Balance of 
Power theory. However, instead of refuting it, Walt proposed to reformulate the theory by 
presenting another perspective (Keohane, 1988: 171). Waltz’s theory predicts that States tend to 
join the weaker side in order to balance their power against the bigger power (Waltz, 1979: 127). 
However, since this theory cannot fully explain the behavior of alliance formation and alliance 
behavior in the face of a perceived threat, Walt’s theory is more suitable for this research.  
The Balance of Threat Theory has its starting point from the Realism paradigm and recognizes 
that States exist in an anarchic world (Walt, 1996: 18). Consequently, security has become the 
most crucial issue for the state and the process in which a country adopts foreign policies is 
highly influenced by how the leaders of that state perceive the external environment (Ibid). On 
that point, the main prediction of the Balance of Threat Theory is that States tend to join the 
stronger or the less threatening side when there is a perceived threat (Kydd, 2001).  
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From the Alliance perspective, Stephan Walt (1988: 275) asks the question "[w]hen will states 
form alliances, and what determines their choice of allies?” He explains that States seek security 
in the face of a threat rather than power (Ibid). Alliances enlarge to accept other States into their 
protection to increase their security and deter the perceived threat (Kydd, 2001: 804). One of the 
components of the concept of Threat is “aggregated power” which argues that if a State has 
greater material capabilities; such as industry and weaponry than that State can pose a greater 
threat (Walt, 1996: 19). Thus, aggregated power is an essential element for the States' perception 
of power (Wivel, 2008: 296). Another component is the "perception of intent" which is the 
uncertainty of how another State will use its aggregated power (Ibid). The level of threat also 
relies on the "offense defense balance" which means that States feel less secure when they can 
easily fight with one another and when it is easy to acquire the necessary means for doing so 
(Walt, 1996: 19). This refers to the lack of deterrence that can stop one State from trying to harm 
another. Finally, “the geographic proximity” (Walt, 1987: 151) is another component which 
considers that the closer the proximity, the greater the threat (Wivel, 2008: 297). In other words, 
States are more concerned about the perceived threats that are geographically closer to 
themselves, than about the ones that are far away. Based on these components, the threat does not 
necessarily mean a direct military action or any aggressive behavior from the external power, 
since the threat is defined by how that State perceives it. 
The components as mentioned above are crucial for the theory to be applied in any given case 
study. The uncertainty caused by an adversary's intentions can create the perception of a threat 
which can encourage an alliance/organization to add more members to balance it. The aggregate 
power influences the States when it analyzes its potential allies. Offense defense balance creates a 
sense of insecurity for States due to the lack of repercussion or international assistance if one 
country decides to harm another country. NATO, for example, found a way around this particular 
component with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty
2, which ensured the members’ security 
                                                          
2
 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, 34 UNTS 243, Article 5: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more 
of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, 
if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense 
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of 
armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures 
taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated 
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and 
security.” 
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through a principle of “one for all, all for one” mutual defense provision. Lastly, when the 
perceived threat is geographically close to the State in question, then the response to alleviate that 
threat should be expected to take place in a timelier manner.   
The framework of the Balance of Threat Theory indicates that for the theory to work on a 
selected case, a perceived threat must be evident and that the threat should fit the components as 
mentioned above. Although this section has only provided the groundwork of what the concept of 
Balance of Threat Theory stands for, in the analysis, the researcher will present evidence of the 
existence of an external threat and explain how this threat links to the geographical importance of 
Montenegro within the NATO-Russia tensions.  
 
3.1.2. The Classical Geopolitics  
In order to evaluate the geopolitical importance of Montenegro in the analysis, it is important to 
understand the origins of the Classical Geopolitics and what the theory entails. To provide a brief 
background; although Classical Geopolitics has very close links with the mainstream Realism 
theories, after World War II, it became somewhat disentangled from the paradigm. The reason for 
that was the German scientists, who used geopolitics to justify their racist expansion ideology 
(Kristof, 1960: 19). This was also referred to as “imperial geopolitics” (ÒTuathail, 1998:16). 
Three pioneers of Classical Geopolitics; Nicholas Spykman (1994), Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890), 
and Halford John Mackinder (1904), who can also be considered Realists (Wu, 2017: 5), 
recognize the State’s search for power and its effects on the nation’s foreign policymaking 
(Sempa, 2002: 75-100). They share the Realist assumptions of the Hobbesian State of nature, 
States’ balancing behaviors, States as the units of analysis, and the international anarchy (Wu, 
2017: 6; Parker, 2014: 15). To emphasize further on the importance of geography in politics, 
Nicholas Spykman (1944) categorizes “geography” as “the most fundamental factor in foreign 
policy because it is the most permanent” (p. 41). Furthermore, Geoffrey Sloan (1988) defines 
geopolitics as “a theory of spatial relationship and historical causation whose perspective is the 
international system as a whole” (p. 20), which simply ascertains how the geographic attributes 
of a state affect its behavior in foreign policies.  
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There are two main strands of thought in Classical Geopolitics. The first is the Organic State 
Theory, which will not be applied in this research, and the second one is Geostrategy. Very 
briefly, Organic State Theory, influenced by Darwinism, asserts that States are in a constant 
struggle for survival; hence, they must either grow or die (Owens, 2015: 469). Geostrategy, on 
the other hand, is concerned with State's behavior, its development, and progress within the 
State's geographical context (Ibid: 470). This behavior in strategy building within the 
geographical context has strong correlations between the maritime or continental features of the 
State (Ibid: 476). The geographical strength of a country, whether it is land-locked or coastal, 
defines the State's foreign policymaking, its strategy, and development; therefore it is more 
dynamic rather than static (Owens, 2015: 477). In other words, geopolitics, and the level of its 
importance are sensitive to the international affairs affecting the State, and a geopolitically 
important State can be open to the exploitations of adversary States (Ibid). Thus, it is up to the 
State to build strategies to turn its vulnerabilities and its geopolitical features into opportunities. 
In this research, the geostrategic strand in the Classical Geopolitics is more relevant to understand 
Montenegro’s geopolitical importance for two reasons. The first reason is that out of two strands 
of thought, only geostrategy examines the geopolitical position of the State and how it impacts 
the State's behavior. In the analysis, after reviewing the geopolitical importance of Montenegro, 
the researcher will look into how this importance created a strategic move for NATO within the 
framework of balancing a perceived threat. The second reason is that the analysis will apply the 
famous geostrategist Alfred Thayer Mahan’s (1890) six factors, which are presented in his book 
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783; 1) geographical position, 2) physical 
conformation, 3) extent of territory, 4) number of population, 5) character of the people, and 6) 
character of the government (p. 28-81). Mahan’s approach was selected by the researcher 
specifically for his particular interest in sea power and coastal States. However, since his studies 
are set in the context of the world order of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, he defined his six factors in 
more imperialistic and colonialist settings contexts, which is not the case in this research. Hence, 
these factors will still be utilized as defined in Mahan’s book; however, the researcher will only 
take the main points of these definitions and disregard the parts which are not suitable for this 
case, or for this era.    
 
17 
 
3.2. Hypotheses 
In light of the views presented in the literature review, and in the theoretical framework of the 
Balance of Threat Theory and Classical Geopolitics, three hypotheses have been formulated to 
analyze and answer the research question. 
H1: Montenegro's geopolitical importance for NATO stemmed primarily from Montenegro's 
geographical position.  
H2: Montenegro's geopolitical importance for NATO stemmed primarily from the desire to 
balance the threat from Russia. 
H3: Montenegro's geopolitical importance for NATO stemmed primarily from Montenegro's 
fulfillment of the NATO accession prerequisites.  
The first hypothesis primarily analyzes the importance of Montenegro’s geographical position 
within the geopolitical framework. Thus, the falsification of the hypothesis can only be achieved 
if the geographical position of Montenegro is not significant enough for NATO.  
The second hypothesis analyzes Montenegro's geopolitical importance and whether this 
importance had an impact on NATO's balancing behavior against the Russian threat. The 
falsification of the hypothesis, therefore, can only be achieved if Montenegro were not 
geopolitically important and if NATO were not acceding Montenegro in order to balance against 
Russia. 
The third hypothesis refers to the three prerequisites of the NATO’s Open Door Policy (NATO 
Official Website, 2017). These prerequisites allow NATO to evaluate a State as a candidate for 
entering its Alliance. The hypothesis asserts that Montenegro has to fulfill the prerequisites, in 
addition to its geopolitical importance, to make a contribution to the Alliance. Thus, if 
Montenegro fails to fulfill the prerequisites, it would mean that Montenegro is not contributing its 
geopolitical importance for NATO; and therefore, the hypothesis can be falsified.  
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4. Research Design 
4.1. Variables 
 
Although there are three hypotheses since the independent variable of the first hypothesis is one 
of the six factors of Classical Geopolitics, the overall analysis will be composed of three 
variables: one dependent and two independent. 
The dependent variable; geopolitical importance, is conceptualized based on Alfred Thayer 
Mahan's (1890: 28-29) six factors; 
a) Geographical position; this factor involves the location of the country, whether it is landlocked 
or has access to the sea and the geographic position of its neighbors.  
b) Physical confirmation, as influenced by the Mahan’s description (1890: 35), is whether the 
country has functioning harbors for military utilization.  
c) The extent of territory indicates the size of the country and the length of its coastal area.  
d) The number of population represents the overall demographic numbers, and how these 
numbers are distributed in the country.  
e) The character of the people factor signifies the main ethnic and religious groups in the county 
and the overall cultural characteristics of the nation. 
f) The character of the government, as Mahan explains (1890: 82) in a broader concept, is 
whether the administration is pursuing a peaceful conduct or an aggressive, war-oriented policy. 
The first independent variable, the second hypothesis, is the balancing against a perceived threat. 
Although Walt’s conceptualization of threat is more befitting to an aggressive confrontation, his 
components of what a threat entails are valid for operating the variable. Thus, the evidence 
retrieved from the media resources and foreign policy documents will analyze the element of 
threat based on four components as elaborated in the theoretical framework. 
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a) The aggregated power of the threat looks into Russia’s aggregated power. 
b) The perception of intent signifies the uncertainties of the outcome of the threat. 
c) Offense defense balance looks into Montenegro's ability to defend itself in the face of a threat.  
d) Geographic proximity looks into the proximity of the threat. 
Lastly, in the second independent variable the prerequisites of NATO’s Open Door Policy are 
based on the three conditions as introduced previously;  
a) Whether the aspirant country is European 
b) Whether the aspirant country is a Democracy 
c) Whether the aspirant country has the willingness and the necessary contribution to commit 
itself to NATO. 
 
4.2. Case Selection 
 
The study in this research will analyze a single case which “investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context” (Yin, 2009: 18). The in-depth analysis will 
be conducted on Montenegro which is selected purposefully since it is the latest addition to the 
NATO Alliance. NATO’s enlargement activities had been inactive since its most recent wave of 
enlargement in 2009, and the invitation extended by NATO to initiate official talks to accede 
Montenegro as its 29
th
 member in 2015 provided an opportunity to investigate Montenegro’s role 
in the very tense environment between NATO and Russia during that period. This opportunity 
qualifies this case study as a “revelatory case” (Yin, 2003: 49). This descriptive single-case study 
can allow the researcher to conduct an in-depth analysis of a particular phenomenon that has yet 
to be investigated. A researcher can only recur to this study when a previously inaccessible 
phenomenon becomes accessible for observation (Ibid: 43).  
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The research in this thesis regarding the case of Montenegro is particularly focused on the period 
between 2006 and 2015. This is the period in which Montenegro became independent and 
became a member of the PfP in 2006, and the time when NATO extended an invitation to 
Montenegro to initiate the official talks for membership in December 2015. Understandably, the 
particular focus here is not Montenegro's domestic policy changes during the accession period to 
acquire full membership, but the role of its geopolitical importance in NATO-Russia tensions, 
and NATO's balancing behavior that eventually led the Alliance to invite Montenegro. Although 
single-case studies are usually too specific to be generalizable to a larger population, they also 
produce a more detailed, in-depth explanation to "the proximal causes of the behavior and 
circumstances" (Bromley, 1991: 86). This explanation is, in fact, one of the reasons why this 
particular research is a single-case analysis.  
 
4.3. Data Collection 
 
The analysis in this research requires extensive qualitative and quantitative data to study three 
main elements; the balancing behavior against a threat, the geopolitical importance of 
Montenegro, and the prerequisites of the Open Door Policy. The sources for the analysis will 
depend on the primary and secondary resources available 
For the geopolitical analysis, geographical data will be obtained from the CIA Work Fact Book 
(CIA.GOV, 2018), which offers comprehensive data on the extent of the Montenegrin landscape. 
The character of people, on the other hand, will be based on Professor Geert Hofstede's extensive 
study on the cultural dimension (Hofstede, 1984) which is comprised of six factors which explain 
the overall characteristic traits of a nation. Other relevant data on population, people's perceptions 
of NATO, and demographic indicators will be retrieved from the World Bank's Urban Population 
and Rural Population indicators (2018c & 2018d), Gallup's study (2017) on Eastern European 
countries perception of NATO, and the Statistical Office of Montenegro (MONSTAT, 2015), 
respectively. Necessary information to determine the character of the government can be found in 
the official reports from the European Commission on Montenegro (2006 & 2015) and European 
Union External Action (2013 & 2014). Since these reports contain brief historical background 
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information on Montenegro and how the nation became independent in 2006, data collected from 
these reports will demonstrate whether the government was pursuing aggressive or peaceful 
international policies.   
The analysis of the threat of Russia requires a different approach. For this variable, the evidence 
of the threat will be acquired initially from media sources both in English and in Russian, and 
then the complementary information will be retrieved from speeches given by the governmental 
officials (The US Senator Speech, 2014; Shuster, 2017). Furthermore, in order to present the 
aggregated power of Russia, data from the Global Firepower (2018; Kosenkov, 2015) will be 
presented for the Military Strength Ranking.   
Lastly, the Democracy of Montenegro, which is the second requisite of the Open Door Policy, 
will use the data from the Freedom House (2009; 2018a & 2018b), and the official reports from 
the European Commission (2008). For additional information on Montenegro's corruption levels 
and its path to democracy, the Transparency International (2018) and the Nations in Transit 
reports (Marovic, 2016) provide extensive data on Montenegro's process. The willingness and 
contribution, on the other hand, will mainly depend on primary sources from the World Bank 
database; such as the Annual GDP, and Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018a & 2018b). In 
the analysis of these prerequisites the willingness will be explained within the lines of 
Montenegro's commitment to the NATO membership process; thus, official NATO reports will 
indicate the necessary conditions for the membership process (NATO, 2016). 
 
4.4. Method of Analysis 
 
The methodology of this thesis will mainly revolve around a qualitative approach, and the 
quantitative data will be utilized for descriptive purposes to illustrate the various components of 
Montenegro. The main reason for the qualitative preference is the exploratory and descriptive 
nature of the research question and the selected case which cannot be analyzed through a fixed 
sequence of steps but rather through the "interconnection and interaction among the different 
design components" (Maxwell, 1996: 3). Thus, from this viewpoint, for the analysis section of 
this research, the Congruence Method (George & Bennett, 2005: 181) will be applied. 
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The Congruence analysis allows the utilization of a case study to collect empirical evidence to 
explain the relevance or the strength of a theoretical approach (Blatter & Haverland, 2012: 144). 
This specific method consists of two sub-types: a) a competing theories approach, and b) a 
complementary theories approach (Ibid). While the former presupposes that one theory is more 
powerful to explain the empirical information and the outcome of the phenomenon than the other 
theory, the latter implies that theories are not necessarily rivals or a source of uncertainty but 
rather a basis for a more comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon (Ibid: 145).This is the 
reason why the method of analysis will employ the complementary theories approach.  
In order to explain Montenegro’s geopolitical importance and NATO’s balancing behavior, the 
analysis will initially consider the dependent variable; the geopolitical importance of 
Montenegro. The second step is to analyze the independent variables; the Balance of Threat and 
Open Door Policy prerequisites, respectively. The third step is the application of the selected 
theories to the hypotheses, which will demonstrate whether they can provide an explanation to 
the research question or not. Thus, if the results indicate that Montenegro was geopolitically 
important in the face of the NATO-Russia tensions and NATO invited Montenegro in 2015 to 
become an ally as a balance against a Russian threat, then the implementation of the 
complementary theories approach within the Congruence analysis method would be achieved.  
Finally, considering that the Balance of Threat Theory and the Classical Geopolitics have never 
previously been used in a complementary manner to explain a phenomenon, the results of the 
analysis will provide unique results as well as motivation for further studies in theoretical 
syntheses in relevant fields. 
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5. Geopolitical Importance of Montenegro 
 
The first chapter of analysis consists of two sub-sections. The first section is solely based on 
descriptive data and information based on Mahan's (1890) six factors. The second section, on the 
other hand, compiles all the data and explains the geopolitical importance of Montenegro for 
NATO. As described in the theoretical framework, the researcher will respect Mahan's definitions 
of these factors; however, these definitions will be applied in a broader sense to capture 
specifically the geographic features of Montenegro in a geopolitical context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Descriptive data of the Geopolitical Factors 
 
a) Geographical position 
The geographical position of a coastal country provides a strategic advantage to the nation and to 
its allies since the nation can utilize its position as a base for military actions against potential 
enemies (Mahan, 1890: 30). Thus, the specificities of the physical location of Montenegro is first 
to be elaborated to illustrate the geographic features of the State. 
The original name of the nation in Montenegrin language is Crna Gora, which means Black 
Mountain, and the administrative capital of the country is Podgorica, which is in the Southeast of 
Montenegro. The political map of Montenegro in Figure 1 illustrates that the Republic of 
Montenegro is in the Southern part of the European continent within the west-central part of the 
Balkan Peninsula. The continental borders of the country are shared with a number of former 
Yugoslav nations; Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Northwest, Serbia in the Northeast, Kosovo in 
Geopolitical Factors 
a) Geographic position 
b) Physical conformation 
c) Extent of territory 
d) Number of population 
e) Character of people 
f) Character of the government 
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the East, and Albania in the Southeast. Montenegro also shares its South and Southwest borders 
with Croatia with a coastline to the Adriatic Sea which has a maritime border with Italy (Allcock 
et al., 2018).  
  
b) Physical conformation 
Mahan explains the physical conformation factor as the access to the seaboard of a country 
(1980: 35). If the country has no harbors on its seaboard, the geopolitical importance decreases 
since the nation cannot have naval sea power or maritime trade power (Ibid.) 
The coastline of Montenegro is between Croatia and Albania on the Southeast side of the 
country. The coastal area is surrounded by the mountains of Orjen, Lovcen, and Rumija 
(Msp.gov.me, 2011). Montenegro possesses two essential ports on the coast of the Adriatic Sea; 
Bar and Kotor. Bar, which is the closest to the end of the Adriatic Sea and the beginning of the 
Mediterranean Sea, is the principal port of Montenegro (Ibid.). Kotor, on the other hand, is 
situated in an indented section of the coastline that is closer to Croatia, in the largest bay of the 
Adriatic Sea (Leadbeater, 2009).   
Figure 1: Political Map of Montenegro (Source: mapsland.com) 
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c) Extent of territory 
The extent of territory here includes not only the square kilometers of the country but also its 
coastline. Mahan emphasizes that the country's length of sea coasts, in proportion to the size of 
the State, should be taken under consideration, as well as the characteristics of its harbors (1890: 
43).    
In that context, data retrieved from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “The World 
Factbook” (CIA.gov, 2018) indicates that Montenegro has a territory of 13.812 square 
kilometers, 13.452 of which is land and 360 square kilometers of coastal waters. The total of 
Montenegro’s Adriatic coastline is 293.5 kilometers. The report ranks Montenegro number 162 
out of 254 countries in regard to the total of land and water areas and categorizes the geographic 
attributes of Montenegro as a “strategic location along the Adriatic coast” (Ibid.). Compared to 
the other European countries, Montenegro’s extent of territory ranks number 38 out of 46, 
followed closely by Cyprus and Luxemburg (Statistics Times, 2014).  
Despite the popularity of Kotor and Bar harbors as touristic destinations, Montenegro has three 
naval bases located in these two harbors; The Bar Naval Base and the "Pero Ćetković" base in 
Bar, and Pristan base in Herceg Novi which is a coastal town at the entrance of the Kotor Bay 
(Montenegrin Navy, 2018). 
 
d) The number of population 
Mahan (1890) explains that the demographic structure of a nation’s population, particularly the 
distribution of it, is another important factor to be considered (1980: 44).  The characteristics of 
the overall population in a country, in this context, can affect the government’s defense and 
foreign affairs policies.   
The demographic data retrieved from the Eurostat (2016) indicates that the Montenegrin 
population had increased from 614,624 in 2007 to 622,099 in 2015. On an international scale, in 
terms of population, Montenegro ranked number 36 out of 48 European countries, followed 
closely by Luxemburg, Malta, and Iceland (Statistics Times, 2015). Figure 2 illustrates that the 
population density is highest in the capital city of Podgorica and the coastal areas which include 
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the municipalities of Herceg Novi, Tivat, Kotor, Budva, Bar, and Ulcinj (Mijanovic & Barovic, 
2015: 381).  
Figure 2: Population Density by Municipalities (Source: MONSTAT, 2015) 
 
e) The character of the people 
Mahan (ibid) explains the factor of Character of People as the national character that examines 
personality traits of the overall population (1890: 50). National character, from this standpoint, 
has an impact on the strategic potentials of the nation’s preferences. Thus, data on this factor will 
first demonstrate the ethnic and religious varieties in Montenegro and the nation’s characteristic 
traits. 
According to the data provided by the Statistical Office of Montenegro (MONSTAT), the 
majority of the population is divided between Montenegrins and Serbians, while the rest is 
composed of Albanians and Bosnians (MONSTAT, 2015: 8). The statistical data of 2011 relating 
to Montenegro’s national characteristics, as displayed in Figure 3 and Figure 4, indicate that the 
dominant ethnic groups in Montenegro are the Montenegrins and the Serbians, and that the main 
religion in the country is Eastern Orthodoxy. Although, Montenegro had both the Montenegrin 
Orthodox Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church in the country, the Montenegrin Church had 
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such little support that it possessed almost no significant influence in the society (Vukomanović, 
2008: 251). The Serbian Orthodox Church, on the other hand, had an immense support by the 
overall population which enabled the institution to have significant influence among people and 
the political establishments in Montenegro (Ibid). This significance will be further elaborated in 
the analysis section of this chapter.  
Figure 3: The Ethnic Structure of Montenegro (Source: MONSTAT, 2015) 
 
Figure 4: The Religious Structure of Montenegro (Source: MONSTAT, 2015) 
 
In order to display the character of Montenegrin people, Professor Geert Hofstede’s (1984) six 
factors of national character are employed. The power distance, individualism, masculinity and 
uncertainty avoidance factors will be analyzed based on Hofstede's (1984: 85) empirical evidence 
on former Yugoslavia nations and the utilization of Serbia indexes as the proxy (see Bar Chart 1) 
since Hofstede’s studies do not include Montenegro. Serbia is selected as the proxy for the 
reasons that Montenegro gained its independence from Serbia only twelve years ago, and that 
Montenegro and Serbia share very similar linguistic, religious, historical and characteristic traits. 
The long-term orientation and indulgence factors, on the other hand, will only use the data on 
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Serbia as the proxy as presented in Bar Chart 1 since Hofstede's study (1984: 85) that provides 
empirical data on former Yugoslavia nations does not include numeric data on these two factors.   
Bar Chart 1: Serbia’s National Culture based on Hofstede Criteria (Source: Hofstede 
Insights, 2018)  
 
The Power Distance of a country indicates the social acceptance of the power in the 
governmental institutions. Hofstede's research demonstrates that former Yugoslavia nations have 
a very high index (76 points) of power distance (Hofstede, 1984: 85). This means that people in 
these nations do not believe that power should be distributed evenly to the citizens. Krivokapic 
and Ceranic (2014), two Montenegrin academicians who based their study on Montenegrin 
cultural attributes, link this phenomenon to the authoritarianism in Montenegro (2014: 207). 
Authoritarianism here is valued as a trait of social psychology, rather than a mode of governance. 
This trait is associated with the dominance of higher-ranking officials, and there is an expectation 
of obedience from those of lower positions (Ibid). From that viewpoint, 74.5% of the 
Montenegrin population agrees that obedience to authority is one of the most important values 
and patriarchal culture is very dominant in Montenegro (Ibid).  
Individualism, as opposed to collectivism, stands for the cultural preference of individuals taking 
care of themselves, while collectivism is a characteristic trait for tightly-knit societies where 
individuals expect their families or social environs to look after them (Hofstede, 1984: 83). The 
index of 1 point is fully collectivist while the index of 100 points is fully individualist. Hofstede's 
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study gives 27 index points for the former Yugoslavia (Ibid: 85), which also reflects Serbia's 25 
index points. Both indexes point towards a very collectivist societal structure. Based on 
Krivokapic and Ceranic’s (2014) empirical data as presented in their article, 67.8% of the 
Montenegrin society expects to be taken care of by the governmental institutions and 72.6% of 
the society comments that their biggest goal is to make their families proud rather than to pursue 
their own individual desires (Ibid).   
Masculinity signifies the characteristic traits of competitiveness, achievement motivation, 
aggressiveness, result-oriented career performance, and control of emotions (Hofstede, 1984: 96-
98). The masculinity index is between 1 and 100; 1 is fully feminine, and 100 is fully masculine. 
Hofstede index for the former Yugoslav states is 21 points, which is on the feminine side of the 
scale (Ibid: 85). Serbian index, on the other hand, is 43 points, which is still on the feminine side 
but very close to the center. Femininity, in this context, represents more emotional displays, a 
higher value for the quality of life, lower career ambitions, and more modest behavior (Ibid: 96-
98). Thus, based on the data of former Yugoslavia and Serbia indexes, if Montenegro's index is 
tentatively ranked somewhere between 21 and 43 points, it can be assessed that Montenegrin 
culture prefers to establish good relations and friendship in its social environment.  
Uncertainty Avoidance is defined as "the degree to which the members of a society feel 
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity" (Ibid: 83). Hofstede's data indicates that former 
Yugoslav states' index is 92 points and Serbia's is 88 points which indicate a high level of 
avoidance of the uncertainty of the future. As in the masculinity index, if Montenegro's position 
is also placed somewhere between 88-92 index points, then it can be concluded that Montenegrin 
culture has a high resistance to change on a social and institutional level since they cannot predict 
the outcome of that change.     
Long-term Orientation refers to the people's preferences "to maintain some links with its own 
past while dealing with the challenges of the past, present and future" (Hofstede Insights, 2018). 
A nation, which scores low, tends to honor its ancient norms and societal rules, while a nation, 
which scores high in this index, usually tends to make more effort in modernizing these cultural 
norms and values to keep abreast of the times (Ibid). The only available numeric data on this 
index is Serbia (see Bar Chart 1), which scores 52 points and thus, does not provide a clear 
preference that would apply to the Montenegrin society. This intermediate score; however, 
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represents that Serbia is somewhat torn between holding on to its old traditions and adopting 
more contemporary traits in its societal system.  
Indulgence, on the other hand, refers to the socialization of the people and the degree of control 
that they have for pursuing their desires (Ibid). Serbia has a low indulgence index point for this 
dimension (28 points), which is consistent with the collectivist social construction of Serbia and 
former Yugoslav countries as indicated in the Individualist factor.  
 
f) The character of the government 
Mahan explains the character of a government on the basis of whether the government is seeking 
war or peace on an international level (Ibid: 82).   
The first indicator to look at to determine whether Montenegro is seeking aggressive foreign 
policies or peaceful conduct is to examine the way the nation obtained its independence from 
Serbia. The country declared its independence on 3 June 2006 after holding a referendum on 21 
May 2006 within the framework of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro (EU Commission, 2006: 5). In accordance with the provisions of the Charter, which 
determined the 55% threshold to validate the outcome, 55.5% of the voters supported 
independence, and 44.5% voted against it (Ibid.). This allowed Montenegro to secede from Serbia 
legally. The fact that Montenegro obtained statehood on substantial legal grounds rather than 
initiating armed conflicts and/or a civil war is an important fact to consider when observing the 
government's mode of conduct.  
Secondly, immediately after obtaining statehood, which is established as a parliamentary 
republic, Montenegro initiated its political trajectory towards the EU and NATO memberships 
(Braun, 2016: 1).  This allowed Montenegro to shape its new administration and governance 
structure in accordance with the EU standards. Examples of such standards are the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement (SAA) signed between the EU and Montenegro in 2007, 
Montenegro’s official application for  EU membership in 2008, the adoption of a new electoral 
legislation in 2014, and the initiation of accession negotiations in 2015 (European Commission - 
Press Releases, 2015).  Furthermore, in respect to NATO, the same year Montenegro gained its 
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independence in 2006, the country became a party to the NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program 
(PfP) which is an individual commitment to initiate bilateral relations and cooperation with 
NATO.  
Thirdly, within the scope of international relations with its neighboring countries, Montenegro 
had proved itself to be a constructive element in contributing towards the stabilization of the 
Western Balkan countries. Since its independence, Montenegro has managed to considerably 
reduce the border disputes with its neighbors Kosovo and Croatia (Dukanovic, 2016: 33). On the 
issue of promoting cooperation on a regional level with its neighbors, Montenegro proposed the 
Western Balkan Six initiative in 2013 which would gather the leaders of the region (Albania, 
Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia). Members of this union purposed to 
support one another in their endeavors of European integration with the framework of the 
Stabilization and Association process (European Union External Action, 2013). Montenegro has 
also taken part in a number of reconciliatory agreements; RECOM and Igman Initiative, and 
managed to maintain overall good relations with its neighboring states (Ibid, 2014).  From these 
perspectives, it is clear that Montenegro had not been pursuing aggressive or offensive foreign 
policies but instead, prioritizing and committing itself to securing the EU and NATO 
memberships for its future. 
 
5.2. Analysis of Geopolitical Importance of Montenegro for NATO 
 
In its broadest terms, Classical Geopolitics defines “Geopolitics” as the geography and its effects 
on foreign policy, which propounds that if geographical attributes are significant enough, then 
they can have an impact on the foreign-policy making. From that viewpoint, and from NATO’s 
perspective, can it be asserted that Montenegro’s geopolitical features are important for the 
Alliance? The answer to this question needs the analysis of the data that was presented in this 
chapter.   
 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the factors of Montenegrin population and the extent of 
its territory are not of considerable significance due to their diminutiveness. Although 
Montenegro has the smallest population in the Balkans, it would be the second smallest state in 
the NATO Alliance, Iceland being the first.  
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The geographic position of Montenegro, on the other hand, presents very important political and 
strategic benefits for NATO. Firstly, a closer look at the Western Balkan map shows that 
Montenegro is the only nation on the Adriatic coastline which does not belong to an international 
organization to promote and ensure its economic, political, democratic or national security. All 
the other nations between the period of 2006 and 2015 were either a member of NATO or the 
EU. Secondly, the Northern and Eastern borders of Montenegro were surrounded by non-EU and 
non-NATO members; Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, all of which are the lowest ranking 
Balkan states in regards to peacefulness according to the Global Peace Index Report (2015). The 
report of 2015 indicates explicitly that Macedonia and Kosovo were the lowest ranking countries 
in the Balkan region regarding stability; Kosovo was ranking 69 and Macedonia 71 (Ibid: 10). 
From a geographic perspective, Montenegro's position provides an immense opportunity for 
NATO to take full control of the Adriatic Sea region, with the inclusion of the Otranto Straits 
which is the door to the Mediterranean Sea, and further benefits to stabilize the non-NATO 
members that neighbor its allies. 
Furthermore, Montenegro's lack of membership to security communities means that its naval 
bases in Kotor and Bar, which are among the largest in the Adriatic Sea that played crucial roles 
during the Republic of Yugoslavia period (Magas, 2003: 76), are open to exploitation by other 
States. Thus, through acceding Montenegro, NATO would provide a possibility to utilize these 
harbors, as needed, for its operations and deployment for its future endeavors, and also close the 
doors against any attempt for potential exploitation and utilization by other external 
actors/countries.  The character of the Montenegrin population presents an interesting aspect to 
look into regarding their ethnic character and their perception of NATO. As indicated earlier, 
75% of the overall population was divided between Serbians and Montenegrins, and the majority 
of the population supported the Serbian Orthodox Church. Furthermore, some parts of the 
Serbian Church were demonstrating a profound allegiance towards Serbia and Russia to a point 
where they even consider the independence of Montenegro since 2006 as a temporary project 
(Buckley et al., 2015). The strong influence of Serbian Orthodox Church and the dominance of 
two ethnic groups in one small country presented a division and a difference of perception 
regarding NATO within the political establishments and the parliament. While Montenegrins 
who mainly supported the pro-Western Democratic Party of Socialists were rooting for the 
country’s trajectory towards NATO and EU memberships, Serbians were demonstrating a more 
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pro-Russian front that could potentially damage this trajectory (Recknagel, 2015). According to a 
more recent poll data retrieved from the International Republican Institute (2017), 54% of the 
Montenegrin population thinks that Montenegro is heading in the wrong direction (towards the 
West). Furthermore, 41% strongly and 10% were somewhat opposed to Montenegro's NATO 
membership. Lastly, Gallup (2017) interview data from 1000 Montenegrins in 2016 indicates in 
Bar Chart 1 that, while 21% of the respondents perceive NATO as "protection," 29% perceives 
the Alliance as a "threat." 
Bar Char 2: Eastern European Countries’ Views of NATO in 2016 (Source: Gallup.com, 
2017) 
 
In retrospect, this negative perception is linked to two aspects; the remembrance of pain from the 
NATO bombings of the Former Yugoslavia in 1999 during the Kosovo War, and the previously 
displayed Montenegro's culture character based on Hofstede criteria. Thus, while "uncertainty 
avoidance" and "indulgence" explain Montenegrins reluctance to become a NATO member due 
to its uncertain security, political and economic implications for the future of the country, the 
historically pejorative views of NATO certainly contributed to this opposition. Interestingly, the 
fact that the Montenegrin government still pursued with its path towards NATO membership in 
spite of the public opposition indicates both the significance and the insignificance of the 
Character of the People factor. It is significant because it is a demonstration that the government 
made a crucial but unpopular decision about the future of the country's prosperity. The impact of 
this decision on Montenegro's democracy is illustrated in chapter 7. The insignificance, on the 
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other hand, is most observable since regardless of its people's opinion, the government became a 
NATO member in 2017.   
In conclusion, while all six factors are defined and analyzed, only two of them demonstrate 
significance in relation to Montenegro’s role in the process towards NATO membership; the 
geographic position of Montenegro and the anti-war characteristics of its government. However, 
a small country like Montenegro’s anti-war preferences does not provide significant benefits 
either for the EU or NATO. Hence, it can be asserted that the geographical position of 
Montenegro which allows access to the Adriatic Sea and fortification of stability in Balkans are 
much more beneficial for the Alliance, and that the peace-oriented foreign policy tendency of the 
government is a complementary feature for Montenegro’s geographic importance for NATO. 
This leaves the importance of Montenegro’s geographical position as the primary factor that 
renders Montenegro geopolitically significant.  
 
Table 1: Summary of Data for the Geopolitical Factors 
 Geopolitical factors Important features 
1 Geographical position          Access to the Adriatic Sea 
         The only country in the Adriatic region without  the 
EU or NATO membership 
2 Physical confirmation          Two important naval ports; Kotor and Bar 
         Three naval bases 
3 Extent of territory          Land: 13.452 square kilometers 
         Coast line: 293.5 kilometers 
         The smallest country in the Balkans 
4 Number of population          Population (2015): 622,099 
5 Character of the people          Two main ethnic groups: Montenegrin & Serbian 
         Dominant Serbian Orthodox Church 
         High level of  uncertainty avoidance 
         High level of respect to the government 
6 Character of the government          Mode of conduct: Peace oriented 
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6. Balancing Against the Threat Russia from a Geopolitical Perspective 
 
As elaborated in the theoretical framework, for the Balance of Threat Theory to work, there must 
be a perceived threat that creates a balancing action against that threat.  
 
 
 
 
 
Throughout the research, the author scanned hundreds of media sources, journal articles, and 
foreign policy papers to understand Montenegro's geopolitical importance and how it influenced 
NATO to officially invite Montenegro to initiate accession talks in 2015. As presented in the 
literature review, the majority of the sources pointed towards the consequences of Russia's 
aggressive foreign policies on Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In other words, 
Russia's growing military presence in Europe manifested a perception of threat both for NATO 
and EU integrity, and NATO acted on that perception by initiating the official process of 
Montenegro's accession in 2015 to promote Article 10 of the Washington Treaty and to show 
Russia that NATO will not be intimidated by the Russian rhetoric against Montenegro-NATO 
relations and its military actions. However, this research asserts that there is more to this story 
than the use of Montenegro as a pawn between the Russia and NATO tensions and that while 
accepting that Russia created a military threat to Europe with the war in Ukraine, there was also a 
more immediate perception of threat that involved Montenegro directly. Furthermore, based on 
the retrieved data from a variety of media sources, this involvement of Montenegro had close 
links to the country’s access to the Mediterranean Sea, through the Adriatic Sea, and the Russian 
involvement in the Syrian war. Thus, before getting engrossed in the analysis of NATO's 
balancing behavior, it is essential to understand the relationship between Russia and Syria within 
a geopolitical context. 
The Balance of Threat Factors 
a) Aggregated power 
b) Perception of intent 
c) Offense defense balance 
d) Geographic proximity 
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The Russian-Syrian relations became very close when the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad 
visited the Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in 2005 (Katz, 2006: 55). Since then, 
Syria has been one of Russia's most consistent partners in the Eastern Arabic peninsula. There are 
a number of reasons for this; both leaders oppose the general concept of American hegemony and 
the US intervention in Iraq (Ibid), Syria was relatively more independent from the Western world 
(Kreutz, 2010), and more importantly, Syria was providing Russia with a direct access to the 
Mediterranean Sea through the Tartus naval base. Why is this access so crucial for Russia? On a 
climatic level, during the winter months, the northern seas freeze and make it quite challanging 
for Russian vessels to navigate through the ice. On a logistic level, in order for Russia to reach 
Southern European countries, Africa and the Middle East, Russia has two options; either use the 
Turkish straits via the Black Sea, which provide a short-cut through the Bosporus and the 
Dardanelle straits that lead directly to the Mediterranean Sea, or make a long detour from the 
Arctic to North Atlantic Ocean and enter the Mediterranean through the Strait of Gibraltar. 
However, this long detour means more expenditure for Russia in order to cover longer distances, 
oil and man-hours. Lastly, on a political level, maintaining its military presence in the 
Mediterranean Sea, particularly in Tartus, which at this point is mare nostrum for Russia, 
balances its zero-sum game with Western countries (Ghilès, 2013).  
Access to warm waters has always been a historical quest for Russia. To explain it in a brief 
historical context, Russia had tried to obtain free access to the warmer waters in order to establish 
easy trade routes with the Eastern Mediterranean and Southern European nations for centuries 
(Chuma, 2016). When the Black Sea was an Ottoman lake during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the Sultans closed the Black Sea and the straits to foreign warships and vessels 
(Hurewitz, 1962: 607). This strategy changed in 1774 with the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty, which 
provided Russia the passage it was seeking for its commercial ships (Ibid). When the Republic of 
Turkey was founded in 1923, the traffic of the commercial and naval vessels was regulated by the 
Treaty of Lausanne; however, in 1936 the complete control of the straits was given to the Turkish 
government with the Montreux Agreement (Ibid). Joseph Stalin strongly opposed to the 
agreement by stating that "it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on 
Russia's throat" (Ibid: 605) and he demanded modifications on the agreement so that Russia could 
move its military vessels and warships freely through the straits (Ibid). In conclusion, these 
modifications did not occur, and Turkey was given the authority to control the straits, closing 
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them if necessary and militarizing them for security. Full Turkish autonomy on the straits meant 
that Russia lost its unhindered access to the Mediterranean Sea and its most cost-friendly 
maritime trade route. Hence, the Russian naval base of Tartus, which is Russia’s only naval base 
outside of Russian territory, became a direct way of ensuring its military presence in the 
Mediterranean region. Access to the warmer waters was what Russia had been trying to achieve 
for the previous two hundred years. Furthermore, according to Sibjen de Jong (Johnson, 2015), 
from The Hague Center for Strategic Studies, Russia did not care whether President Assad stayed 
in power or not, so long as the geopolitical interests of Russia were preserved. These interests 
included the continuation of Russia’s military presence in the East of Mediterranean region.  
The recent initial actions of Russian naval deployment to the Mediterranean coasts in the 
relatively small Tartus base started in 2012 in connection with the civil war in Syria (Nikolsky, 
2014). The continuation of the crisis and lack of imminent threat from the Western or NATO 
intervention, the number of Russian warships in Syria started to increase (Ibid). However, the 
Tartus naval base was smaller in size and did not have sufficient space to accommodate the 
increasing number of Russian ships. These considerations, in addition to the uncertainties of 
whether the Syrian President al-Assad would regain the control over his country, provide a 
logical reason why Russia started to look for other possible locations for establishing an 
additional naval base. For obvious reasons, these locations could not be a NATO or an EU 
country, or a pro-Western state. Israel should also be discarded due to its close political relations 
with the US. Thus, Russia approached Egypt in 2013 to establish a new naval base; however, the 
project failed to materialize after the Obama administration’s ultimatum and threat to cut off 
financial assistance to Egypt (Staff, 2013). This left Montenegro as the most plausible option, 
owing to its Soviet-links and its small economy.  
Due to the uncertainties of the outcome of the Syrian civil war and the future of the Russian 
Tartus, in 2013, Russia evacuated Tartus, the only Russian base outside of its country (Weir, 
2013). Although the Russian government did not provide a sufficient explanation to the media 
agencies for the reasoning behind the evacuation of the Tartus base, the ongoing political and 
military tensions in the region suggest that plausible reasons for this action could be protecting 
the Russian soldiers, civilians and technicians from the anti-Syrian government oppositions, and 
the promotion of the upcoming Geneva talks on stabilization of Syria (Ibid). In the same year, the 
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Russian government began to request the use of Montenegro’s Bar Harbor as a Russian naval 
base in exchange for billions of dollars’ worth of investment (Balkaneu.com, 2013; Petrovskaya, 
2015). In order to maintain its military presence in the Mediterranean Sea, Montenegro was the 
most plausible alternative for Russia. Montenegro was not a member of the EU or NATO, and as 
indicated in the previous sections, Montenegro had a high-level of economic dependency on 
Russian investments, and a minimal amount of military capabilities with a limited budget for 
rapid development. Although the Montenegrin government refused to allow access to Russia’s 
military presence in Montenegro, favoring its positive progress towards NATO membership, the 
vulnerability of Montenegro and its openness to external influences, particularly the Russian 
impact on the nation's economy and politics, created a perception of threat for the US. 
The threat, here, is analyzable through four factors that were introduced in the theoretical 
framework. Within the context of aggregated power, irrefutably Russia is one of the most 
significant forces in the international world order. It possesses the world's most extensive nuclear 
inventory (Kile & Kristensen, 2017), and holds the second rank within the scope of military 
power with a minimal difference to the US (Global Firepower, 2018). According to Global Power 
Index (2018), which comprises 55 different factors from the quantity of military personnel and 
arsenal to weapon diversity, the US’ index in 2018 is 0.0818, while Russia’s index is 0.0841. 
These rankings were also quite similar in 2013 and 2014 reports (Kosenkov, 2015). Thus, 
considering that the greater the power of the country, the greater the threat it poses, Russia's 
military capabilities and its requests to install these capabilities in Montenegro could justifiably 
be treated as a threat to Euro-Atlantic integrity. 
The second aspect to look into is the perception of intent, as in uncertainty of Russia's motives 
when they requested the use of the Bar Naval Base. Information on how Russia exactly planned 
to utilize the Bar Naval Base is lacking; however, even the mere existence of Russian warships in 
the Adriatic Sea, on top of the Russian extant political capital in the nation would certainly 
contribute to the perception of threat. Furthermore, considering Russia’s military involvement in 
the Syrian war since 2010 and the eruption of the Ukraine war in 2014 along with the Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea, NATO simply could not risk Montenegro turning into a similar case to 
Sevastopol in Crimea or Tartus in Syria in the middle of a region surrounded by NATO allies. A 
Russian military base on the coasts of the Adriatic Sea would both potentially compromise 
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European security and the Euro-Atlantic integration. In addition, although there is no reputable 
media source or literature to prove this idea, the LNG (liquefied natural gas) stations, owned by 
American, Italian and Qatar companies (Leick, 2005), on the offshores of Montenegro and the 
Northern part of the Adriatic Sea could  also be perceived as an attractive bait for Russia. When it 
comes to LNG stations and their pipelines, the Adriatic Sea can play an important potential role 
for the Balkan countries, since there are a number of ongoing LNG development projects that 
may potentially significantly reduce the Balkan’s energy dependency on Russia (Milatovic & 
Sanfey, 2015). These then are the reasons why uncertainty related to the ulterior motives of the 
opponent is a component in the perception of threat. Thus, acceding Montenegro to NATO and 
decreasing the Russian influence in the region were the most strategic solutions against the 
ambiguous policies of Russia, concerning Montenegro.  
The third factor is the offence defense balance, within the context of the Balance of Threat 
Theory, which creates a sense of insecurity for the less powerful party. Here, the less powerful 
party is the Montenegrin government, which had been trying to create a political balance between 
NATO and Russia in order not to risk its path to the NATO membership or Russia's considerable 
investment in the country (Jankovic, 2014). NATO did not have any legal standing to deter 
Russia from its military investments in Montenegro other than starting the formal accession 
process as soon as possible and using the membership itself as deterrence. Russia, on the other 
hand, was pursuing a soft power policy in Montenegro by politically influencing the Serbians and 
propagating anti-NATO actions to inhibit the integration process of Montenegro, which was 
weakening the Montenegrin government in the face of divided aspirations (Dempsey, 2014).  
The fourth component of the threat, geographic proximity, is the most befitting one within the 
geopolitical context. The fact that Russia was seeking to establish new naval bases in the 
Mediterranean Sea both relates to the geographic proximity of Russia to the Eastern NATO 
countries and Montenegro, and to Montenegro's proximity to the Mediterranean Sea. Montenegro 
is in a very strategic geographic location, which would allow maritime access to the Balkan 
nations and the Otranto Strait and provide two critical harbors both for touristic and military 
purposes. The possession of this strategically important location was of interest both for NATO 
and Russia. From the NATO perspective, obtaining full control of the Adriatic Sea would not 
only stop Russia from any future attempts to establish a naval presence in Europe but also would 
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prevent Russia from gaining power in the Western Balkan regions. From Russia’s perspective, 
losing Montenegro to the “enemies” would close the Otranto doors to Russia forever.  
It was interesting to discover that Russia was pursuing such maritime policies at around the same 
time as the war in Syria and Ukraine was taking place. But, it was even more interesting that, as 
laid out in the literature review, all the analysis on reasoning and justifying NATO’s invitation of 
Montenegro as the 29
th
 member to the Alliance in 2015 was almost exclusively related to 
NATO's promotion of the Open Door Policy and its links to the Ukraine war. This raises the 
question of whether Russia's requests to establish a naval base on the Adriatic coast of Bar would 
indeed create a perception of threat in the eyes of NATO. It could have been an accurate 
assumption, considering the fact that Montenegro rejected Russia's billion dollar investment 
project in Bar. However, as the Montenegrin Prime Minister Dusko Markovic, elected in 2016, 
stated in a Q&A session, a nation like Montenegro, which has no significant military contribution 
to make for the organization, can offer strategic leverage to NATO against its opponents 
(Shuster, 2017). He further explained that since the Bar Harbor is very important for the NATO 
opponents, meaning Russia, due to the ongoing conflicts in Syria, Montenegro could provide a 
win for NATO in its power game with Russia (Ibid). An interesting aspect of the Prime Minister's 
acknowledgment of the Russian attempts in the Bar Harbor is the timing. The fact that Russia 
made its first request in 2013 and that the Q&A with the Prime Minister happened in 2017 
suggests that Russia had been more assertive in its requests than it was reflected in the media 
sources. This strengthens the seriousness of the threat posed by Russia against NATO directly 
though Montenegro.  
Furthermore, how this threat element was perceived by NATO, particularly by the US is most 
observable from the speech given by the US Senator Christopher Murphy, Chairman of the US 
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs (The US Senator Speech, 2014). In 
his speech, he urges the US government to increase its involvement in the Balkan countries since 
“Russia is sitting on the doorstep, ready to take our place” (Ibid). While the Senator praises 
Montenegro’s willingness to become a full member of NATO, he also states that “Russia sees 
this glaring NATO gap on the Adriatic, and hasn’t given up trying to step in and fill the role as 
Montenegro’s protector. Russia would like nothing more than to have a proxy in the middle of 
NATO’s Balkan arm” (Ibid). Moreover, on the issue of Russia’s offer to establish a military base 
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in Montenegro in exchange for billions of dollars, the Senator also touched upon the issue of 
Montenegro’s fragile and dependent economy on Russia. Considering that Montenegro was also 
recovering from the after-effects of the Euro crisis during that time, an investment of that scale 
would have been hard to repeatedly turn away from. We have to understand that, although we 
know now that the Montenegrin government indeed did not accept the Russian offer and instead 
pursued with its path towards NATO membership, that between the years of 2013 and 2014 when 
there was no official invitation from NATO or no assurances of a full membership, Montenegro 
could have accepted the offer and allowed Russia access to the Adriatic Sea. Finally, in the light 
of the perceived threat of Russia, the Senator urged NATO to invite Montenegro into the Alliance 
to inhibit Russia’s further political and economic involvement in the process;   
 
The different discourses from the US and Montenegro demonstrate how Montenegro’s 
geographic position could have an influence on the NATO’s foreign policies, and how the 
Russian "meddling" could create a threat from the NATO perception. Although the full contents 
of the statements are not presented here, their numerous expressions reflect all four components 
of the threat as defined in the Balance of Threat Theory. While the Senator's speech particularly 
includes the aggregated power and perception of intent components, the Montenegrin Prime 
Minister was more concerned with the offense defense balance and the geographic proximity of 
Russia. Russia’s constant investment in media and real-estate to preserve its influence in 
Montenegro is referred to as aggravated power. Thus, as quoted from numerous Russian officials 
in the literature review, Russia had threatened Montenegro, on more than one occasion, to cut 
“[W]e shouldn’t fear upsetting Russia over a NATO invitation to Montenegro. 
[ ]. NATO should offer membership to Montenegro as soon as possible. Russia 
is trying to muddy the waters as quickly as possible inside Montenegro, and we 
shouldn’t just assume that Montenegro will continue to spurn Russia’s security 
offers if NATO continues to spurn Montenegro. The reasons to keep 
Montenegro out of the alliance just don’t hold water any longer. Yes, the 
country has a long way to go when it comes to the rule of law and freedom of 
the press. But this is an incredibly young nation, and modern democracy takes 
time. And it’s worth asking the question whether they’ll get there faster as part 
of NATO’s umbrella or Putin’s.” US Senator Christopher Murphy (The US 
Senator Speech, 2014) 
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foreign direct investments in the country if the nation followed through with the NATO 
membership. Consequently, if Russia followed through on its threat, it was capable of crippling 
Montenegro's already fragile economy. The uncertainty, on the other hand, was noted by Senator 
Murphy who commented that: "Disturbingly, it is hard for Montenegro to turn a blind eye to 
Russian money and influence" (The US Senator Speech, 2014).  Prime Minister Markovic, on the 
other hand, was more concerned about the geographic proximity of Russia and its presence in 
Syria and Europe, and Montenegro's lack of capabilities to defend itself (Shuster, 2017). 
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7. NATO’s Open Door Policy Prerequisites and Its Analysis on Montenegro 
 
This chapter of the research focuses on NATO’s previously elaborated Open Door Policy 
prerequisites and the implementation of these requirements on Montenegro. The purpose of this 
chapter is to analyze to what extent Montenegro fulfills the conditions that eventually allowed 
NATO to extend the official invitation in December 2015 to the Montenegrin government. 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Geographic location 
The first prerequisite of the NATO’s Open Door Policy is the geographic location of the aspirant 
State. Thus, in order for a state to apply for NATO membership, the state has to be on the 
European continent. From that viewpoint, as indicated earlier in the analysis of Montenegro’s 
geopolitical features, Montenegro is a Western Balkan state which is within the borders of the 
European continent. 
 
b) Democracy 
The second prerequisite of the Open Door Policy specifies that the aspirant state for the NATO 
alliance has to adhere to democratic values. Considering that one of the primary goals of NATO 
enlargement is to promote stability and prosperity in Europe, the aspirant state is also expected to 
share similar democratic values with the Alliance (NATO Enlargement Fact Sheet, 2016).  
Democracy is defined as a functioning "democratic political system" (Ibid) which can be 
analyzed through the data retrieved from Freedom House (FH) reports on Montenegro (Freedom 
House, 2018a). The particular reason for selecting this institution is because of its specific 
Open Door Policy Perquisites 
a) Geographic location 
b) Democracy 
c) Willingness and Contribution 
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analysis of a government's implementation of political rights and its respect for civil liberties, 
both of which are befitting in the analysis of a "democratic political system." 
The Freedom in the World reports from 2006 to 2015 demonstrate, in Table 2, that between the 
years 2006 and 2008, the first three years after obtaining statehood, Montenegro was rated Partly 
Free. Starting from 2009, Montenegro managed to increase its ratings to Free, which lasted until 
2014. More recently, in 2015, we can see that the ratings drop to Partly Free again, and despite 
its drop in rank,  Montenegro received its official invitation from NATO to initiate the talks for 
full membership to the Alliance in that same year. 
 
Table 2: The Democratic Chronology of Montenegro (Source: Freedom House, 2018) 
    
Year Freedom Rating* Civil Liberties** Political Rights*** 
    
2006 3.0 3 3 
2007 3.0 3 3 
2008 3.0 3 3 
2009 2.5 2 3 
2010 2.5 2 3 
2011 2.5 2 3 
2012 2.5 2 3 
2013 2.5 2 3 
2014 2.5 2 3 
2015 3.0 3 3 
 
 
 
The compilation of Freedom House reports between 2006 and 2008 explain that one of the 
reasons for the Partly Free rating during this period was because of the problems related to 
* 1=Best, 7=Worst **1=Best, 7=Worst ***1=Best, 7=Worst 
1.0 to 2.5 = Free,   3.0 to 5.0 =  Partly Free  5.5 to 7.0 =  Not Free 
45 
 
widespread corruption on a governmental level, which mainly involved Milo Djukanovic, the 
long-term leader of Montenegro who assumed the position of Prime Minister in 2008 after the 
presidential elections. The second prominent reason was the judicial system and how it was 
dependent on the political authorities and raised the questions of impartiality of the prosecutors 
and judges in the system (Freedom House, 2009). Montenegro's Progress Report of the EU 
(European Commission, 2008: 11) also shared similar concerns since Montenegro had failed to 
adopt and to implement specific laws within the predetermined deadlines. The same report also 
presented observations on political influence in the prosecution system since the Prosecutorial 
Council members are elected by the Montenegrin Parliament (Ibid). 
In 2009, Montenegro scored high enough to be ranked as Free due to the increase in its respect 
for Civil Liberties (see Table 2) and the progress in combating corruption in the public sector; 
however, the overall perception of corruption in the public sector remained high (see Table 3). 
This perception of corruption has been one of the main disconcerting issues relating to 
Montenegro. Montenegro's anti-corruption report of 2014 (Shukla, 2014) states that although 
Montenegro had adopted a number of policies and laws to combat this issue, the implementation 
of them, particularly in the public sector had been considerably weak. The most challenging areas 
where the political corruption was most observable were reported to be in the election processes, 
political party funding, and the abuse of state power (Ibid). These findings are aligned with the 
data from the World Bank. According to the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
Montenegro's control of corruption had increased from 40% in 2006 to 54% in 2015 (World 
Bank, 2018b). 
In 2015, Montenegro’s freedom index dropped from Free to Partly Free (see Table 2), in spite of 
the government’s efforts towards taking constructive steps on the nation’s path towards EU and 
NATO membership. Although this regression would be expected as a result of the increasing 
corruption scores in the government (see Table 3), data from Freedom House shows that the 
decline is actually originated from the Civil Liberties indicator (see Table 2). Since 2013 
Freedom House has been analyzing Civil Liberties and Political Rights by applying certain 
factors (Freedom House, 2016), and the ratings for these categories indicate that the main reason 
for this drop is due to the -1 decrease from the Association and Organization Rights factor under 
the Civil Liberties indicator. This caused the overall score of Civil Liberties to go down from a 
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scale of 2 to 3 (see Table 2). While peaceful association scored 10 in 2013 and 2014, for 2015 the 
score went down to 9 (Ibid). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This decline also correlates with the eruption of protests against the Montenegrin government in 
2015. These protests, organized by the Serbian-dominant pro-Russian opposition called the 
Democratic Front, were primarily aiming at the Former Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic’s 
foreign policies and overall governance and demanding his resignation (Komnenic, 2015). 
During the protests, the Former Prime Minister blamed the Democratic Front for trying to 
sabotage Montenegro’s accession to NATO and trying to stall NATO’s invitation process with 
these demonstrations (Marovic, 2016: 2). Police forces, on the other hand, were accused of 
abusing their power and using excessive force against the protesters with tear gas and brute force 
which had extensive coverage in the national and international media channels. Hence, due to the 
reaction of the government against the protests and demonstrations, the Association and 
Organization Rights score decreased and caused Montenegro to fall back to the Partly Free zone. 
Table 3: The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) - 
Montenegro (Source: Transparency International, 2018) 
Year CPI Score* 
World Rank/ 176 
countries 
   2007 3.3 84 
2008 3.4 85 
2009 3.9 69 
2010 3.7 69 
2011 4 66 
2012 4.1 75 
2013 4.4 67 
2014 4.2 76 
2015 4.4 61 
* 0.0= Highly corrupt, 10.0= Highly Clean 
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EP - Electoral Process 
CS - Civil Society 
IM - Independent Media 
NDG - National Democratic 
Governance 
LDG - Local Democratic Governance 
JFI - Judicial Framework and 
Independence 
CO - Corruption 
These indications are also supported by the data presented in Table 4 on Montenegro’s 
democratic transition score. The data on 2016, which reflects the observations on 2015, points out 
an increase in Local Democratic Governance from 3.25 to 3.50. This increase means that local 
institutions; municipalities and governmental bodies, are too dependent on the authority of the 
central government. Likewise, the fragile financial situation of Montenegro (World Bank, 2018a) 
combined with the continuous violations of the rule of law, also contributed to the weakening of 
Local Democratic Governance in the country (Marovic, 2016). Thus, Local Democratic 
Governance, along with the unchanged scale of National Democratic Governance and slightly 
deteriorated Independence of the Media tipped the scale of Montenegro’s governance towards 
authoritarianism (see Figure 5). 
NATO's Open Door Policy requires that the aspirant country must be a democracy, and although 
the reaction of the Montenegrin government against the protesters from the opposition parties 
caused the ranking of Montenegro's democracy decline to a more precarious position, we cannot 
assert that Montenegro is not a democracy. On the contrary, it should be considered that 
Montenegro is an electoral Democracy, with a mixed parliamentary and presidential system, and 
has been dealing with a high level of corruption, political division, a strong governmental 
authority, and pervasive violations of the rule of law, certain liberties and freedom of media (see 
Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Democratic Progress of Montenegro in 2014 (Source: Marovic, 2015) 
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Table 4: Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores (Montenegro) 
(Source: Marovic, 2015) 
  
NIT Edition 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Electoral 
Process 
3.50 3.50 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.50 3.50 3.50 
Civil Society 3.00 3.00 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 
Independent 
Media 
3.25 3.50 3.75 3.75 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.50 
National 
Democratic 
Governance 
4.50 4.50 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 
Local 
Democratic 
Governance 
3.50 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.50 
Judicial 
Framework 
and 
Independence 
4.25 4.25 4.00 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Corruption 5.25 5.50 5.25 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Democracy 
Score* 
3.89 3.93 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.82 3.82 3.82 3.86 3.89 3.93 
*The democracy scores: 1= Highest level of democratic progress,  
                                          7= Lowest level of democratic progress 
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c) Willingness and contribution 
The third and the last prerequisite of the Open Door Policy requires the applicant government's 
willingness to join the NATO operations and bring forth a contribution to the collective defense 
organization. Thus, the analysis of this prerequisite contains how Montenegro demonstrated its 
willingness to the NATO Alliance, which includes the pre-accession requirements that 
Montenegro fulfilled and the NATO operations that Montenegro participated in. The second part 
looks into the military capabilities of Montenegro to demonstrate to what extent the country can 
bring a contribution to the Alliance.  
In order for a nation to accede to NATO, the government initially has to take institutionalized 
steps that demonstrate its commitment to the organization. After a State proves itself to be worthy 
of full-fledged membership, NATO extends an invitation to the country to initiate official talks of 
accession. The rest of the process is followed by NATO's monitoring the aspirant government's 
implementation of the administrative and military reforms and eventually signing the Accession 
Protocol with the candidate (NATO Foreign Ministers, 2015). 
It has become a common practice since the 1990s that aspirant countries participate in NATO’s 
PfP program, engage in the cooperation mechanisms that come along with PfP, and then sign the 
custom-made Membership Action Plan which evidently provides access to a full-fledged 
membership to NATO. The PfP program is a bilateral understanding between the individual 
aspirant countries and NATO (NATO PfP, 2017). The program allows Euro-Atlantic partners to 
build a cooperative relationship with NATO that enables them to develop their defense system 
and infrastructure, including military training and collaboration on scientific and environmental 
issues under NATO standards so that the aspirant country can eventually become a NATO 
member (Ibid). After initiating the first dialogues with NATO through PfP, the aspirant nation 
selects one of the bilateral cooperation documents which gives the framework of the objectives 
and goals of cooperation. These documents are the Individual Partnership and Cooperation 
Program (IPCP), The Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), or the Annual National Program 
(ANP) (NATO, 2016). Briefly, the IPCP is the most standard document which is entirely modular 
and adaptable. It is based on the interests and objectives of the aspirant country and NATO (Ibid). 
The IPAP requires a more in-depth cooperation between the candidate and NATO on a political 
level. By constantly interacting with the NATO team, the government pursues on democracy and 
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security through domestic and institutional reforms (Ibid). Lastly, the ANP is the most 
demanding document of the three, which consists of a very comprehensive set of reforms on 
democracy, security and defense (Ibid). 
While the first step consisted of selecting a tool that sets the tone of cooperation with NATO and 
develops the governmental institutions of the aspirant country, the second step is more about 
actively involving NATO operations. NATO offers a number of tools for the candidates to help 
them develop the defense capabilities that would make them eligible for participating in NATO 
operations. Some of these tools include the Planning and Review Process (PARP), the 
Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC), Military Training and Exercise Program (MTEP), and 
the Political-Military Framework (PMF) (Ibid). Very briefly, PARP develops capabilities of 
military forces and makes them available for NATO training and operations. The OCC is a more 
rigorous program used for training land, maritime and air military personnel and ensures its 
readiness for NATO deployment. MTEP is a five-year plan for training with NATO. Lastly, the 
PMF is the set of guidelines and political consultations to be followed when the country decides 
to participate in a NATO-led operation (Ibid). 
It is essential to understand that through all these programs and tools, NATO provides a wide 
range of opportunities and flexibility for the aspirant countries to prioritize their areas of 
cooperation, their activities and their goals. When a country becomes a participant to the PfP 
program, NATO presents around 24 different areas of cooperation and more than 1.400 
individual activities that the country can choose from and develop its custom-made trajectory 
(Pond, 2004).  When the country selects its activities, they present them to the NATO members in 
a Presentation Document, and a two-year IPP is drawn up, which identifies the aspirant nation's 
goals and objectives (Ibid). The IPAP is a step forward from the IPP for further integration on a 
security/defense level. When countries commit themselves to this advanced tool, they ensure 
their opportunity for the Membership Action Plan (MAP). The MAP is the primary tool to 
become a member of NATO. It is a tailor-made partnership activity program for consultation, 
assistance, and support for the aspirant country. PARP, on the other hand, is a primary tool for 
interoperability which identifies the capability requirements and the country's contribution to the 
NATO-led operations (Ibid). 
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Montenegro’s tailor-made trajectory started in 2006 with its participation in the PfP Program in 
the Riga Summit and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (Vuckovic et al., 2016: 603). From 
the moment when Montenegro gained its independence and statehood in 2006 to NATO's 
invitation in 2015, the Montenegrin government had shown a significant commitment to the 
Euro-Atlantic integration. The country had resolved the majority of the ongoing disputes with its 
neighboring countries and promoted a significant amount of regional stability which rendered the 
nation as a "champion" of implementing reforms and meeting NATO's requirements (Lilyanova, 
2016).  
In 2008, during the Bucharest Summit, NATO officials started the Intensified Dialogues (ID) 
process with Montenegro while also initiating Montenegro's participation in the IPAP (NATO 
News, 2008). The Montenegrin government identified its key areas of cooperation as defense and 
security sector reforms, civil emergency planning and security-related scientific collaboration 
(Liyanova, 2016). In record time, Montenegro managed to finish its IPAP in 2009 and ID in 2010 
and due to its favorable progress, Montenegro was invited to join the MAP in 2009, and the first 
cycle of MAP implementation started in 2010. This cycle allowed Montenegro to present the key 
challenges that were needed to be addressed by NATO (NATO Archive, 2017). The IPP, changed 
into IPCP in 2012, and the PARP, was integrated into the framework of the MAP (Vuckovic et 
al., 2016: 604).   
In 2009, Montenegro also joined the Adriatic Charter for NATO, an association which was 
initially formed by the former aspirant countries Albania, Macedonia and Croatia, under the 
leadership and assistance of the US in 2003 to help the candidate countries on their path to 
NATO membership. The Adriatic Charter was a means of ensuring the continuation of the 
NATO's Open Door Policy and the integration of Euro-Atlantic countries under the democratic 
principles of NATO, which was only possible with the involvement of the US (Grdesic, 2004: 
116).  
Between the years of 2009 and 2015, Montenegro worked on its MAP to implement the 
remaining programs and mechanisms in its administrative and defense/security systems. The 
progress of cooperation with NATO was presented through the ANP reports (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Montenegro, 2018).  The fifth and last report of ANP presented four issues that the 
Montenegrin government indicated as areas of improvement: the rule of law, security, defense, 
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and public support of Montenegro's membership of NATO. As it has been presented in the 
previous chapter that the views of Montenegrins on this particular issue is quite divided. 
However, the government's will and ambition to commit the accession process remained intact 
which is observable with the government's introduction of the Parliament Resolution in 2015 on 
Montenegro's support and commitment to the integration to NATO (CdM, 2015). 
While the Montenegrin government’s willingness to become a part of NATO is apparent, the 
contribution it is bringing forward to the Alliance is another aspect to look into. Starting with the 
financial aspect of Montenegro’s contribution, Table 5 indicates that the military and defense 
expenditure of Montenegro had been in a constant decline. Thus, considering that NATO had 
established 2% of its annual GDP to be spent on defense and security for its members, 
Montenegro is far below that percentile with 1.3% expenditure in 2015, which is also lower than 
the average of the European percentile of expenditure which is around 1.6% (Pryce, 2015).  
Given the average of its 4 billion-dollar GDP and 57 million-dollar defense expenditure with a 
population count of 600.000 citizens, the country’s financial contribution to the Alliance had 
been quite limited.   
Another aspect to consider when analyzing Montenegro’s contribution to NATO is the military 
capacity of the country. Although the Armed Forces Personnel indicator in Table 5 accounts for a 
total of 12.050 troops in 2015, the actual numbers are a bit more different. The World Bank data 
includes the paramilitary forces in training in the cumulative armed forces, which accounts for 
approximately 10.100 soldiers in 2015 (Sosic, 2015). The number of active military personnel, on 
the other hand, was only 2.080; 1.500 in the army, 350 in the navy, and 230 in the air (Ibid).  
However, even with its small army, Montenegro had displayed a significant commitment to the 
NATO's overseas operations. Since 2010, Montenegro had been deploying soldiers to 
Afghanistan, first within the International Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) from 2010 to 
2014, and then the with the Resolute Support Mission in 2015. However, the number of troops 
that the Montenegrin government could spare was quite minimal. For ISAF, while in the 
beginning, the Montenegrin government was deploying around 40 troops to Afghanistan, this 
number decreased to 25 troops by the end of 2014 (NATO and Afghanistan, 2017a). For the 
Resolute Support Mission in 2015, the government deployed 17 troops to the station (NATO and 
Afghanistan, 2017b). 
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Complete interoperability between the Montenegrin military capabilities with the other Member 
States was very unlikely under these circumstances. Although the government had been working 
towards implementing IPAP and other programs in its defense and security systems for years, the 
Montenegrin forces were still significantly reduced. The Montenegrin Air Force, as an example, 
was almost non-existent. Montenegro inherited the Golubovci airbase after separating from the 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which only possessed a few jets that were quite expensive to 
operate, and the military assets in the Montenegrin Navy were not any better than its Air Force 
(Pryce, 2015). According to the report, provided by the Montenegrin Ministry of Defense in 
2013, Montenegro spent 15% of the country's GDP on renovation and modernization of the 
military assets, most of which were inherited from the former Yugoslav times (Ministry of 
Defense, 2013). Thus, along with its 2.080 active military personnel, it is safe to assert that the 
main reason for NATO's policy to invite Montenegro was not to bring a meaningful contribution 
to the collective defense organization.  
In the light of the collected data, Montenegro fulfills the NATO's prerequisites of the Open Door 
Policy in a limited capacity, which consists of its geographic position, as in being a European 
country, and its willingness for commitment. The country's democracy had dropped to a more 
fragile State in the same year that NATO invited Montenegro, and the military contributions were 
unlikely to have increased the overall security of the NATO Member States or the Western 
Balkan region. Therefore, in the light of the presented data and the analysis, NATO's invitation to 
Montenegro in 2015 suggests that NATO’s integration policy can be considered as a more 
strategic policy than an aggregation of material power.  
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Table 5: Collective Data of Montenegro's Military Contribution  
     
 
GDP (current US$)* 
Military 
expenditure (% of 
GDP)** 
Defense Expenditure 
(Million US$)*** 
Armed forces personnel 
(total)**** 
 
    
2006 $2.696.020.574,583 2,312705735 n/a 16000 
2007 $3.668.857.103,750 1,749695109 n/a 15000 
2008 $4.545.674.527,611 1,872181256 n/a 15000 
2009 $4.159.330.369,547 1,843757578 n/a 13227 
2010 $4.139.192.052,980 1,814347747 74 13084 
2011 $4.538.198.498,749 1,748969303 80 12180 
2012 $4.087.724.527,817 1,656463855 68 12180 
2013 $4.464.260.488,582 1,452260994 65 12180 
2014 $4.587.928.884,171 1,472271497 69 12180 
2015 $4.052.913.385,827 1,37049762 57 12050 
     
* Source: The World Bank Database (2018a) 
**  Source: The World Bank Database (2018c) 
*** Source: NATO Press Release (2017) 
****  Source: The World Bank Database (2018d) 
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8. Discussion 
 
Throughout this research, the focal point has been the geopolitical importance of Montenegro, its 
role in the NATO and Russia tensions and how it may have influenced NATO's balancing 
behavior. The eruption of the war in Ukraine toppled with Russia's annexation of Crimea created 
a blast of tensions between NATO and Russia, which left Montenegro with the obligation of 
making tough choices. Despite the Russian threats and political meddling, Montenegro never 
wavered from its path to a full NATO membership. More importantly, although the country could 
not bring any significant security contribution to the world's largest collective defense 
organization, it provided something more important than the military assets or personnel; a win 
for NATO against Russia in a very intense political climate. 
In the analysis of geopolitics, out of six factors, Montenegro's geographic location seems to be 
the factor that most strongly supports the first hypothesis. Montenegro was the last country on the 
Adriatic region that was not a member of either the EU or NATO and was in a perfect situation to 
be utilized by both of these international organizations to consolidate the European integrity and 
the Balkan's stability. Another significant consequence of Montenegro's accession to NATO is 
that through this membership, pro-Russian Serbia would be surrounded by the Allies, and the 
overall Russian influence in the region would diminish considerably. 
Furthermore, theoretically speaking, before its membership of NATO, Montenegro signified a 
potential base for the Russian fleets, warships, and commercial vessels. At the very least, Bar and 
Kotor harbors could have been utilized by Russia as a periodic stop for maintenance or as a way 
station for its other warships in the Mediterranean Sea. The NATO membership, in a way, 
restricted Russia to the Eastern Mediterranean part of the region with one naval base in Syria, 
whose future is uncertain. Bar and Kotor, on the other hand, can be renovated and be of service 
for the NATO allies. Thus, in the light of these considerations, the first hypothesis which asserted 
that Montenegro's geopolitical importance for NATO stemmed primarily from Montenegro's 
geographical position is supported. 
The analysis also demonstrated that Montenegro’s geopolitical importance that stemmed from its 
geographic position also caused an additional threat to the European security and the Western 
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Balkan integrity. It is an open secret that Russia was, and in a way, still considering the former 
Yugoslav countries as an outpost for its own political agendas, and Russia’s exploitation of 
Montenegro in this context was not different. A Russian military presence on the coasts of the 
“NATO Sea” was a threat to the US' military hegemony in the Central and Eastern European 
countries. The Balance of Threat Theory, from this viewpoint, explains NATO's behavior to 
accede Montenegro when it did. Although NATO did not increase its relative power against 
Russia, the close geographic proximity of the threat and the ripeness of it in 2015 indicate 
significant evidence that NATO was balancing a potential Russian threat that stemmed from the 
geopolitical significance of Montenegro. In the analysis, the media coverage and the quotations 
from two government officials; one from the US and another from Montenegro, provided that 
Russia was repeatedly requesting the naval base in Montenegro. On the account of perception of 
intent, in what capacity Russia was intending to utilize the Bar Naval Base if the Montenegrin 
government provided access was a great uncertainty, which added to the overall perception of a 
threat. The perception of the threat here, by no means can be treated as an aggressive one. 
However, it played an important role in the competition between NATO and Russia, where the 
"winner" would either increase or establish its military presence in a geopolitically important 
location. From this viewpoint, the second hypothesis of this research, which was combining 
Montenegro's geopolitical importance for NATO and the balancing behavior of NATO against 
the Russian threat, is supported, based on the data from the analysis section and its results.  
It has to be taken into consideration that today Montenegro is an official member of NATO and 
that Montenegro has taken a political and economic risk by spurning Russia to favor NATO. 
However, in 2015 and the years leading to NATO's official invitation, the overall political 
climate was not as clear as it is now. Numerous reasons existed to block Montenegro's 
membership, and although Montenegro had displayed a significant desire to become a member, 
willingness alone is not enough to secure NATO membership. Accession to this particular 
international organization requires the fulfillment of very stringent conditions to preserve the 
democratic norms and implementation of the rule of law. The preservation of these norms can be 
considered crucial for the survival of NATO and the unity of its allies. However, while NATO 
had been announcing that acceding Montenegro was a remarkable demonstration of Article 10 
and the robustness of its Open Door Policy, Montenegro could only succeed in partially fulfilling 
its prerequisites. The country was European, and it was willing. However, when it comes to 
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democracy and contribution, Montenegro failed to display significant progress. As indicated in 
the analysis, Montenegro's civil liberties and political rights dropped from Free to Partly Free on 
the same year that NATO extended its official invitation to Montenegro, due to the restrictions on 
association and organizational rights, police brutality, and corruption. Although the analysis 
showed that public uprisings were caused by the pro-Russian Serbians in Montenegro in order to 
postpone and to sabotage the country's advancement into NATO membership, the government's 
mode of conduct was the most significant factor that dropped the nation's democracy indicators. 
Thus, considering Montenegro's democracy, and its minimal military contribution to the Alliance, 
the most substantial contribution that Montenegro could provide to NATO remains geopolitical 
importance. In light of the data and the analysis as presented in chapter 7, Montenegro could only 
partially fulfill the prerequisites of NATO’s Open Door Policy. This enables the researcher to 
weakly support the third hypothesis; Montenegro's geopolitical importance for NATO stemmed 
primarily from Montenegro's fulfillment of the NATO accession prerequisites.  
In conclusion, the data, the analysis, and the results allowed this research to take a unique 
perspective of theory application. As described in the method of analysis section instead of 
rivaling the existing theories to prove which one explains the phenomenon better, this research 
purposed to use two existing theories, but three rationales, in a complementary manner to 
demonstrate why Montenegro was important to NATO. Indeed, for this particular phenomenon, if 
the Balance of Threat Theory were to be removed, then the analysis would be mired down since 
various components of the theory would be missing from the research, and the Classical 
Geopolitics Theory would not be able to capture all the factors to provide a thorough explanation. 
The complementary approach in the Congruence Method allowed for a more comprehensive 
research design to answer the research question. In-depth analysis of Montenegro with the 
application of the Classical Geopolitics and the Balance of Threat Theory not only allowed the 
researcher to characterize the particularities of one location but also, demonstrated closer ties 
with geostrategy. As explained in the theoretical framework, Classical Geopolitics stemmed from 
organic State theory and geostrategy, and this research utilized the factors listed by one of the 
pioneers of geostrategy, Alfred Thayer Mahan. From this perspective, it was fascinating to see 
how accurately the geopolitical importance of Montenegro influenced the strategic behavior of 
NATO, which arose from a perceived threat caused by Russia's persistent approach to the 
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Montenegrin government. Furthermore, although Walt's description of threat and its components 
were more befitting to an aggressive direct military threat, the four components were still quite 
useful to explain the various aspects of how a non-aggressive threat was perceived by NATO.  
 
9. Conclusions 
 
The primary purpose of this study was to conduct an in-depth analysis on Montenegro and its 
geopolitical features to observe to what extent these features played a role between NATO and 
Russian tensions. Furthermore, the research also purposed to find evidence of a Russian threat 
that was not only caused by Russia's annexation of Crimea but also another phenomenon that 
influenced NATO to extend an invitation to Montenegro in 2015. The reason for this assertion 
was that in spite of its limited military capabilities, small population, a fragile economy, half of 
the citizen's opposition, and the decrease in its democracy, Montenegro was still under the 
consideration as a suitable candidate for NATO. This led the researcher to ask whether there are 
other considerations for NATO's interest in Montenegro and found out that Montenegro's 
politically crucial geographic position was possibly the most important reason for NATO's 
acceptance of Montenegro. The primary results indicated that, indeed, the importance of 
Montenegro's geographic location is twofold for NATO. First, as a West Balkan State with close 
historical, political and economic ties with Russia, the accession of Montenegro to NATO was a 
direct message to Russia that NATO will not be deterred or vetoed by third parties. Second, for 
Russia, Montenegro was the most eligible and the last standing castle to establish military 
cooperation with its government, which would be most undesirable for NATO endeavors of 
bringing stability and integrity under the NATO umbrella. 
The overall research itself also purposed to produce a comprehensive study on Montenegro, 
which was lacking considerable in the existing literature. In other words, this single case-specific 
approach with the utilization of two existing theories to explain one phenomenon does not 
produce a generalizable outcome; however, it brings clarity and completeness to understand the 
phenomenon from different perspectives. This is one of the reasons why, in the literature review, 
a large variety of quotations was used to reflect the opinions and the rhetoric of governmental 
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officials from Montenegro, Russia, and NATO. Another reason is to demonstrate how 
Montenegrin government managed to thrive on implementing necessary policies to secure its 
path to NATO under significant pressures from Russia. 
One of the most intriguing parts of the research is the second section of analysis which is on the 
NATO's balancing behavior against the Russian threat. The very fact that how complementary 
geopolitics and the balancing theory are when it came to explaining Russia’s requests to the 
Montenegrin government to establish a second naval base in the Mediterranean Sea and this 
phenomenon’s recognition by several reputable sources solidify the validity of utilizing theories 
in a synthesized manner.  
 
9.1. Limitations 
 
The most challenging aspects of this research were the language restrictions and lack of 
accessible resources. Since the online search engines do not recognize the Montenegrin language, 
and the translation of official texts from the Montenegrin government was scarce, the majority of 
the research had to be dependent on the limited number of official reports, analyses, and data 
collected and written mainly by non-Montenegrin resources. The Montenegrin perspectives, on 
the other hand, were solely depending on the English texts written by the Montenegrins. Another 
struggle in this aspect was the limited data and resources on Montenegro, and although this was 
one of the reasons why Montenegro was so interesting for the researcher, lack of data on 
Montenegro still affected the comprehensiveness of the research. 
Limitation of the research design is also an aspect worth mentioning. As stated earlier, a single-
case study provides a limited basis for generalization. How can we generalize the complementary 
approach of the Balance of Threat Theory and the Classical Geopolitics which were utilized to 
give a thorough explanation of a Russian threat for NATO emerged because of the geopolitical 
importance of Montenegro? Evidently, this case-specific study cannot represent a larger 
population, but the method of analysis can open new doors for further research. 
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9.2. Implications for further research 
 
Considering the results of this research, would it be possible to use the same method of analysis 
to provide a deeper, more comprehensive explanation for other phenomena as well? Frank 
Schimmelfennig (2003: 284), as an example, used Rational Institutionalist and Constructivist 
Theories to create a theoretical synthesis to present more empirical data and a more 
comprehensive explanation for the EU and NATO enlargement. From this perspective, what 
other theories can be used in a complementary manner to explain a phenomenon? Or, it is 
possible to use Classical Geopolitics as a unit of consideration to understand other accession 
processes of NATO? Iceland, for instance, a founding member of NATO and also a small island 
country which is situated in the intersection of the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, did not have 
a  standing army to offer NATO's collective defense. Then, how else can we explain Iceland's 
NATO membership other than its most crucial geographic position which functions as a control 
port for Russia's warships? From this viewpoint, using the Congruence Method, with the Balance 
of Threat Theory and the Classical Geopolitics, the same research could be implemented 
analyzing the case of Iceland as well. The perception of threat would again be Russia and 
considering the timing, the raison d'être of NATO formation as well, and  Geopolitics could 
explain the other members' considerations for accepting Iceland as a founding member, even 
though the country was lacking any sort of material and military contribution to the Alliance.   
In consequence, through this single-case analysis, the researcher managed to produce a 
comprehensive study on the 29
th
 and the newest addition to the NATO Alliance which was 
lacking significantly from the existing literature. Moreover, through the Congruence Method, 
which allows the theoretical synthesis of two different theories, the researcher managed to 
produce an original work, by complementing the Balance of Threat Theory with the Classical 
Geopolitics, which has never been implemented before. Finally, with the utilization of the 
Classical Geopolitics in a slightly modified manner, which was somewhat abandoned from the 
Realist paradigm and the overall field of International Relations in academia, the researcher 
managed to emphasize the importance and the robustness of the theory by implementing it on one 
of the most contemporary phenomena.   
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